Lessons from the Arab Spring. by Fayad, Khalil Ibrahim
 
 
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
Prerequisites for a Peaceful Transition: 
Lessons from the Arab Spring 
 
By 
Khalil Ibrahim Fayad 
 
 
A thesis  
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Arts and Sciences 
June 2013 
  ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
To my parents, Ibrahim and Mona Fayad whose words of encouragement and push for 
tenacity ring in my ears, my sisters Manal Fayad and Mariam Jaber for standing beside 
me. In addition , a special feeling of gratitude to my loving big brother Rabih and his 
wife Racha for giving me the strength and motivating me for achieving  my higher 
education at LAU.  
I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr. Imad Salamey, for his guidance and 
support throughout this study, and especially for his confidence in me. His comments 
and guidance were very constructive for me in order to finalize my paper. I would also 
like to thank Dr. Sami Baroudi and Marwan Rowayheb for serving as members in my 
thesis committee. Also, I would like to thank Mrs. Dana Ariss-Nasr for assisting me 
throughout my paper.  
Finally, to all my friends, thank you for your understanding and encouragement in my 
many, many moments of crisis. Your friendship makes my life a wonderful experience. I 
cannot list all the names here, but you are always on my mind  
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
Prerequisites for a Peaceful Transition: 
Lessons from the Arab Spring 
Khalil Ibrahim Fayad 
Abstract 
The Arab Spring brought optimism about the prospect of democratization in the region. 
However, transition toward democracy was often violent, prompting concerns about the 
price of freedom. While Egypt and Tunisia underwent smooth and relatively peaceful 
transition in ousting autocratic regimes, both Libya and Syria were devastated by violent 
confrontations. This thesis examines four claimed prerequisites for peaceful transitions: 
the existence of civil society, degree of economic disparity, military loyalty to the 
regime, and the utilization of social media. A comparative country analysis is conducted 
to compare the various propositions in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen. An index table of peaceful transitions is developed. The thesis revels that 
among the decisive factors contributing to violent or peaceful transition lies in the 
military‟s loyalty to the regime. Yet, the strength of civil society and the spread-out of 
economic grievances are significant aspects that cab neutralize the regime‟s coercive 
apparatuses.  
 
Keywords: Democratic transitions, Military loyalty,  Civil society, Economic 
disparity, Social media, Arab Spring  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
On December 17, 2011, almost two years ago; a young citizen from a small 
Tunisian town set himself on fire and with the same match ignited a revolution across 
Tunisia. His name is Mohammed Bouazizi. His story first started when Bouazizi tried to 
fight a fine issued by  a policewoman, by first appealing to the police force, then to town 
officials, and finally to the regional officials .
1
 Each time Bouazizi tried to present his 
case, the security officers beat him up. After the humiliation and frustration by the 
officials‟ cruel treatment, Bouazizi set himself on fire. However, Bouazizi didn‟t die 
right away but remained in the hospital until January, 4, 2011. Three weeks after the 
incident, he died in a hospital in Tunisia and his death resulted in an immediate and 
unplanned national uprising.  
According to Yasmine Ryan (2011), a journalist for the Al-Jazeera English 
Channel, the news of Bouazizi‟s death traveled fast, even though the state-run media 
ignored the whole incident. The angry protests that erupted all over Tunisian soil were 
indeed spur-of-the-moment; nevertheless these protests were marked by a level of 
organization that shows how the protesters were determined to create change (Ryan, 
                                                          
1
 See “How the Tunisia’s Revolution began”, at 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html, [Accessed January 
28, 2013]. 
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2011). Therefore, by the end of December, 2011, it was through text messages and 
social media that Tunisian citizens experienced what the sociologist Doug McAdam 
calls “cognitive liberation” (as cited in Hussain & Howard, 2011, p36). According to 
McAdam, Cognitive liberation happens when people come to recognize that by mass 
mobilization, change in the society occurs. As a result, the Tunisian activists were using 
methods of communication to group and organize themselves, in ways that the state 
could not control although it tried (Ryan, 2011). Citizens also used digital media to 
arrive at strategies for action, such as satellite phones to keep in touch with the 
international media agencies and organizing gatherings against the regime.  By the time 
the Tunisian former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia to Saudi Arabian 
exile on January, 14, 2011, civil disobedience grew against authoritarian rule in 
countries such as Egypt and Yemen (Hussain & Howard, 2011).  
According to many Middle East observers, such as Philip Howard, the Egyptian 
people shared many hopes and goals with their counterparts in Tunisia. As the second 
largest internet users in the region, only after Iran, Egyptians shared the news of Ben 
Ali‟s departure quickly (Howard & Hussain, 2011).  Moreover, the story of Bouazizi 
could be compared to the story of Khaled Said, a 28year old blogger, whom the secret 
police had tortured to death on June 6, 2011 for revealing the regime corruption. Just as 
Bouazizi photos in the hospital where spread via social media, shots of Khaled Said‟s 
battered face were taken by his brother as Said‟s body lay in city morgue were also 
circulated among Egyptians. 
 3 
 
On January 25, 2011, the first demonstration erupted in Liberation Square at the 
heart of Cairo. 
2
 Egyptians went to the streets in massive numbers, calling it a "day of 
rage". Thousands marched in downtown Cairo, calling for Hussine Mubarak to step 
down from the office. After several days the protesters grew in number across Egypt and 
were organized by digital media such as Facebook and twitter (Ryan, 2011). 
Furthermore, in the last week of January, 2011, the former Egyptian president Hussine 
Mubarak in a desperate attempt, tried to disconnect the country from the internet, in 
hope that these tactics will marginalize the volume of protesters. However, high tech 
Egyptian students and bloggers overcame Mubarak‟s plan by placing backup satellite 
phones and dial up connections from Israel and Europe (Howard & Hussain, 2011). 
Therefore maintaining close ties with the outside world. In other words, Egyptian 
officials, including the president, were about to be “ousted due to mass protests 
coordinated and announced through social media” (Thompson, 2011, p.175). It only 
took eighteen days for Mubarak to submit his resignation under huge pressure from the 
protesters. 
Meanwhile, in other countries, such as Lebanon, Sudan, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and 
Syria minor protests erupted over issues ranging from economical to political ones. In 
some countries, such as Syria and to a lesser extent Yemen, violent clashes between 
protesters and security forces erupted and are still ongoing. As a result, many scholars 
started calling these movements the “Arab Spring”.3 As mentioned earlier, the transition 
                                                          
2
 The massive gatherings took place in Tahrir Square (liberation square) as it was seen as symbolic heart 
of the Egyptian revolution. These events took place over the course of eighteen days, from January 25 
2011, through February 11 2011. It is widely accepted that the main catalyst of the revolution was the 
Face book page, set up by Google executive Wael Ghonim, entitled “We Are All Khaled Said.”  
3
 To name few scholars, such as Muzammil Hussain  and Yasmine Ryan 
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that Tunisia experienced occurred at relatively the same time as the transformation in 
Egypt, and they have been followed by democratic transitions in the Middle East in 
countries such as Syria, Libya and to a lesser extent Bahrain. There have been some 
explanations on how the Middle East suddenly experienced democratic transition.
4
 
However, despite high hopes for a smooth democratic shift in the Arab Spring countries, 
countries like Libya and Syria have undergone violent transitions. On the other hand, 
Egypt and Tunisia underwent smooth and relatively peaceful transitions. Therefore this 
thesis aims to explore the different conditions that played a role in determining the end 
result for the democratic transition in the Arab Spring.  
By reviewing the most prominent views given by many scholars such as Georges 
Corm and Muzammil Hussain ,  this thesis identifies four main conditions that played a 
major role in shaping the outcomes of the transition 
5
(i.e. whether a peaceful transition 
or a violent one) . The four major conditions are: the presences of civil society (mainly 
NGO‟s), economic disparity, military loyalty to the regime,6 and social media 
utilization.
7
 In particular, this paper describes how these different conditions influence 
the democratic transitional outcome either to a smooth democratic change or to a violent 
one. The paper will study each condition from a comparative perspective in different 
countries that witnessed uprisings (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain) 
with respect to Tunisia. 
                                                          
4
 These explanations will be discussed in the literature review   
5
 The theory behind democratic transition is discussed under the rational part in chapter one  
6
 I use the term military loyalty to describe a country’s regular army, while other terms such as security 
services include, but are not limited to Special Forces, police, and intelligence personnel. In order to use 
simple terms I will refer to these different branches as “armed forces”, while I will adopt the term 
“military forces” to describe the country’s regular army. 
7
 Social media in this context refers to blogs, social networking sites such as twitter and Face book, and 
content communities such as YouTube. In some cases I might refer to traditional  media such as Al-
Jazeera in the context of  the effect of social media in the Arab revolution  
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1.2 Rationale 
 
Before outlining the different chapters in this study, this section will discuss why 
the study of four main conditions that played a major role in shaping the outcomes of the 
transition is important. As such, two crucial questions are put forward: what is a 
democratic transition?  What are the four conditions that this paper identifies? In order 
to clarify the research question, this paper needs to review some theories on transition 
towards democracy such as James Fishkin in the context of the current research and try 
to classify the each of the four conditions.    
1.2.1 What is democratic transition?  
 
“The study of democratic transitions focuses on the critical step in the history of 
democracy when a country passes a threshold marked by the introduction of competitive 
elections with mass suffrage for the main political office in the land”( Fishkin, 2000 , 
p.54). This field of study is merely a part of a boarder field of study in democratic 
theory, its main characteristics is the ability to move from an authoritarian system to a 
democratic system.  One main indicator of a democratic transition is the ability to have 
free and fair elections. The pioneer views of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl on 
democracy led to a boom in the field of democratic transition (Fishkin, 2000). 
According to Joseph Schumpeter (1976) democracy is essentially based on free and fair 
elections that are held on a regular basis. Therefore, it could be achieved if such 
elections take place in a country on regular basis; however, this definition has been 
elaborated through Robert Dahl‟s definition of democracy. Dahl‟s (1989) definition of 
democracy (or what he calls polyarchy) could be a more helpful approach for 
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understanding the major element in democratic transition. According to Dahl (1989), 
democracy consists of different institutions; such as the right for free expression, the 
right to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections; the right to run for 
office, the right to form and participate in independent political organizations, including 
political parties; the right to gain access to independent sources of information; the 
rights to any other freedoms and opportunities that may be necessary for the effective 
operation of political institutions of large-scale democracy (Dahl,1989, p.221). 
Therefore, democratic transition is essentially found when countries have the ability to 
move from one regime (i.e. autocratic – or the ruler who has absolute power) to another 
(i.e. democratic). 
1.2.2 What are the four conditions? 
 
In order not to fall into the trap of generalization, defining and describing the four 
conditions is necessary.  
1.2.2.1 Social media utilization 
 
 It is important to study the extent to which social media was utilized, in the form of 
blogs, social networking sites, such as twitter and Facebook, and content communities, 
such as YouTube. These social media tools might not be specifically named but will be 
used to describe some of the events of the Arab Spring throughout the thesis. In some 
cases this dissertation might refer to traditional media such as Al-Jazeera in the context 
of the effect of social media in the Arab revolution.  It is important to understand how 
social media with all its different components helped in shaping the current Arab 
revolution.   
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1.2.2.2 The presence of civil society  
 
The definition of civil society, according to the World Bank refers, 
To the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations 
that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values 
of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, 
scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of 
organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, 
faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundation. 
(2010)  
 This thesis will focus mainly on NGO‟s ability to work and exists in each country. 
In this paper, civil society is an important player in the Arab Spring in countries like 
Egypt in playing a critical role in organizing and leading the youth to their demands. 
Therefore, by studying NGO‟s presence this paper will examine how the civil society 
functions in terms of political harassment, red tape and the degree of its presence 
throughout the uprisings.  
1.2.2.3 Economic disparity 
 
The economic disparity can be attributed as the main trigger for the Arab uprisings. 
Many scholars such as Georges Corm (2012) attribute that socio-economic factors were 
behind the massive uprisings in the Arab world. Therefore by examining the gap 
between the upper and the lower classes, in addition to the deterioration of the middle 
class this paper will give an indication of how this condition helped in the transition 
towards democracy. 
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1.2.2.4 The loyalty of the military to the regime 
 
In this condition, it is important to understand each country‟s top ranking army 
leader‟s decision whether to fight and oppose the demonstrators or to side with them. It 
is important also to study some tactics used by the regime such as Michael Makara‟s  
(2012) explanation of the regimes Coup-Proofing strategies to keep the army bass 
leaders loyal. Such tactics include lucrative incentives and maintaining the rule of the 
army with close relatives of the regime.  
1.3 Research questions 
 
As discussed in this chapter, by reviewing the most prominent views given by many 
scholars such as Georges Corm and Muzammil Hussain ,  this thesis identifies four main 
conditions that played a major role in shaping the outcomes of the transition (i.e. 
whether to peaceful transition or to a violent one). As such, in order to explore this topic, 
one main important research questions has been identified: 
              1) How do the four conditions (civil society, social media, economic 
disparity, and military loyalty) influence the democratic transitional outcome? 
1.4 Significance of the study 
 
This study is significant for its contribution for understanding the expected outcome 
of any revolution that possesses similar characteristics as the Arab uprisings. Events in 
early 2010 in Arab uprisings hold significant ramifications for how the US, among many 
others, approaches this seemingly unstable region (i.e. Middle East).  International 
observers and scholars need to learn as much as possible about the main triggers, how to 
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anticipate the outcomes, and how to effectively deal with mass uprisings, while serving 
in increasingly complex environments. As there does not appear to have been one 
specific cause for the Arab Spring, this paper examines what can describe as the “four 
main conditions” for the Arab transition towards peaceful/ violent democracy. It is 
important to understand these four conditions in order to framework the preconditions of 
any peaceful (or violent) transition towards democracy.  Ultimately, the research 
question lies therein. How do the four conditions influence the democratic transitional 
outcome? 
1.5 Thesis structure  
 
This section introduces the five remaining chapters in this thesis. It is also necessary 
to describe the motivation behind this research, along with the significance of the study 
to be used throughout the paper. Chapter one describes these background elements, 
while subsequent chapters proceed as follows: chapter two contains a comprehensive 
review of the existing literature on the different conditions that vary between economic 
to social factors. This chapter provides a detailed background about the different 
theories on how the “Arab Spring” blossomed and offers some explanation on the real 
triggers of the revolution. It will also recapitulate work in these key areas to reveal how 
each theory is interconnected with the other to form an indicator in shaping the final 
outcome of the transition.  
Chapter three describes the methodology this paper utilizes, that is the comparative 
approach in order to reveal the role of each condition in the transition, either peaceful or 
violent. The focus will be on the different relative levels of each condition to understand 
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the outcomes of each transition, whether it would lead to a peaceful transition towards 
democracy or towards a violent one. By focusing on each condition independently 
during a crucial time and location within the Arab Spring concentrating mainly on 
Egypt, and using it as a benchmark because of its relatively peaceful transition in 
comparison other countries, this paper will serve as a link for these different conditions. 
Moreover, this study will propose a theoretical index table which will help understand 
the effects of each of the four condition‟s major role in shaping the final outcome of the 
transition. Chapter four fully describes this framework, based on the different 
assumptions of what triggered the Arab Spring (i.e. different theories), and assess the 
findings of this study through the lens of the proposed framework. Furthermore, the use 
of specific examples from countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain) 
that witnessed the uprising will arrive at a useful answer to the central research question. 
This thesis, will argue for the importance of understanding the four conditions that 
this paper identifies, that played a major role in shaping the outcomes of the revolution. 
The paper also suggest that a useful way to consider the four conditions is to examine 
each condition from a comparative perspective based on its relative existence or absence 
in one country  and then try to link the outcomes with other Arab countries that 
witnessed the uprisings, such as Syria and Yemen. Further, this study argues that the 
abundance of some of these four conditions (i.e. civil society “mainly NGO‟s”, 
Economic disparity, Military loyalty to the regime, and Social media utilization) will 
lead to a smooth democratic change, while the absence or lack of some of the four 
conditions will lead to a violent transition towards democracy. Finally, in chapter five, 
this thesis will share the findings that emerge during the course of this study, reveal the 
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significance of the study‟s conclusions, the limitations, and make recommendations for 
future research in this critically important field.  
1.6 Possible findings  
 
Based on the proposed framework, this study will lead to understanding the 
conditions that help in the democratic transition in a peaceful way.  This thesis argues 
that the abundance of civil society and social media utilization by the country will lead 
to a relatively peaceful transition towards democracy, while the abundance of the 
economic disparity and military loyalty to the regime will lead to a violent transition 
towards democracy. As a result countries such as Egypt that possesses a high level of 
civil society with a high level of social media utilization will lead a relative smooth 
democratic change. On the other hand, countries such as Syria that that possesses a high 
level of economic disparity with a high level of military loyalty to the regime (i.e. bass 
army leader) will lead to relatively more violent transition towards democracy.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The process of democratic transition is by no means an easy procedure. While some 
countries had succeeded in peaceful democratization, in others the process of establishing 
democracy was the result of violent conflicts triggered by socio-economic factors and 
failure to repress the revolution by the regime. This chapter reviews some of the major 
themes and debates on transition toward democracy. In addition, this section highlights 
some key theoretical issues in the literature on transitions to democracy. This chapter also 
examines violent vs. non violent transition and correlate it to the democratic revolutions. 
Furthermore, this chapter examines the theories on social media, civil society, military 
army, and finally economic disparity in the context of their ability to affect the transitional 
outcome. By studying these four conditions given by prominent scholars
8
, this chapter 
concludes on the importance of empowering the civil society and increasing the free flow 
of information in the country. It also stresses on the importance for determining the right 
method for handling the military role during the transitional phase and understanding the 
role of economic disparity in the transitional phase. A final section will elaborate on the 
rate of these different conditions and significance during the Arab uprisings.  
2.2Defining democratic transition  
 
The pioneer work of Guillermo O‟Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) offers a 
useful definition on how transition occurs. According to O‟Donnell and Schmitter (1986), 
                                                          
8
 To name few Philippe Schmitter, Justin Clardie, and Seymour Martin Lipset 
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“the „transition‟ is the interval between one political regime and another” (p.6).  
furthermore, “Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of 
dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form 
of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a 
revolutionary alternative” (p. 6). However, the only disagreement with their discussion of 
the concept of transitions is their dispute that “the extent that there are any effective rules 
and procedures, these tend to be in the hands of authoritarian rulers” (p. 6). This might be 
true in the early phases of transitions, but it cannot be the case for the whole transitional 
phase. Gradually, at some point the authoritarian regime will lose their ability to 
unilaterally name the rules and regulations (Mainwaring, 1989).  
Moreover, moving from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one is by no means a 
small achievement.  Thus, many scholars, such as Andreas Schedler argue for the ability 
to sustain the democratic transition and to move into the process of consolidating 
democracy.
9
 In the immediate aftermath of the “third wave” of democracy, countries 
started looking for ways to strengthen and stabilize these newly found regimes (Schedler, 
1998). The concept of “reverse waves" (Huntington, 1991), where countries go back to 
authoritarian regime, has lead to an increased focus on the methods and techniques to 
strengthen and stabilize the democratic transition phase. This is what has come to be 
called "democratic consolidation" (Schedler, 1998, p.91). According to Scheduler (1998), 
democratic consolidation “was meant to describe the challenge of making new 
democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making 
                                                          
9
 Is the process of deepening and strengthen the democratic values in a country 
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them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against 
eventual reverse waves" (p.91). 
Nevertheless, one should not take the process of democratic transition as a constant 
set of rules, nor as a set of constant change. But there are better ways to interpret the 
process of transition towards democracy. For instance, O‟Donnell (1988) in his more 
advanced explanation of democratic transition clarifies the two stages that any transition 
to democracy should go through: first the transition towards a democracy (I.e. the initial 
stage of breaking up an authoritarian regime) and then to a more sophisticated stage which 
is the transition to a consolidated democracy. A further argument given by Scott 
Mainwaring (1998) is to differentiate between a “democratic government” and a 
“democratic regime” (p.2). For him “Regime, of course, is a broader concept than 
government and refers to the rules (formal or not) that govern the interactions of the major 
actors in the political system. The notion of regime involves institutionalization, i.e., the 
idea that such rules are widely understood and accepted, and that actors pattern their 
behavior accordingly” (p.2). 
One of the core criticisms of Schmitter and O‟Donnell‟s theory is that they do not 
consider that mass movements can lead to a political threat to the regime. As mentioned 
earlier, Schmitter and O‟Donnell (1986) describe the notion of transition to democracy in 
the hand of the authoritarian rulers. Therefore, the degree of success of the democratic 
transition relies on the degree at which the elite‟s political reforms become more 
important to them than maintaining the status quo (Bermeo, 1997). This is called 
transition from above. However, Nancy Bermeo (1997) acknowledges the role of the elites 
in the transition to democracy, but it puts more weight on the role of the mass 
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mobilization in the democratic transition. To further illustrate, Jean Elisabeth Wood 
(2000) in her book “Forging democracy from below: Insurgent transitions in South Africa 
and El Salvador” tries to dissect the process of democratic transition in South Africa and 
El Salvador. She argued that due to the mass pressure from the population, these two 
countries had to democratize. This is referred as transition from the bottom. 
Furthermore, the notion of peaceful democratic transitions is usually parallel with 
high levels of civil liberties. Such a transition reflects the social agreement between all 
groups which are politically representatives and those rulers who intentionally abstain 
themselves from wasteful rent extraction (Cervellati, Fortunato, & Sunde, 2011). On the 
other hand, any democratic transition that goes into violent conflict is more likely to lead 
to a system with low levels of civil liberties. Rulers deliberately do not give up to the 
people‟s demands and respond to these demands by violent means. As a result “the 
politically (and economically) deprived segments of the population can trigger violent 
conflicts to obtain control over the state apparatus” (Cervellati, Fortunato, & Sunde, 2011, 
p.1). It is commonly accepted that peaceful transitions lead to improvements in 
economical libration and political freedom. However, this is not the case for 
democratization during violent conflicts where civil rights and political freedoms are 
restrained. Moreover, according to Lipset (1959) the increase in equal wealth distribution 
and the relative increase in human capital (among many others) are central for the 
emergence of democracy. In order for any revolution to succeed, it needs some conditions 
(identified by this paper as social media, civil society, military army, and economic 
disparity) which determine the specific transition scenario (peaceful/violent transition).  
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2.3Military role in democratic transition 
  
According to Justin Clardie (2010), the literature on the role of the military in the 
transition to democracy has reached consent on the fact that any new democratic 
government must give priority to its civilians to control the role of the military army. 
Therefore, the main argument is how the military‟s role affects the democratic transition. 
Clardie (2010) examines two schools of thoughts; the first one argues the importance of 
increasing the resources for the military during any transitional phase. The other argues 
the importance of decreasing the level of resources given to the military during the 
transitional phase.  
The literature behind the importance of increasing the military resources relies on two 
reasons. The first reason is simply to “placate the military” (Clardie, 2010, p.4). The logic 
behind this reason relies on the process of the transition where there are winners and 
losers in the political sphere. Therefore, it is important for the new government 
(supposedly democratic) not to establish the wrong perception to the military as a loser in 
this democratic transition (Clardie, 2010). If this were the case, the new government could 
face a big problem with the military leader since they might perceive democratic transition 
as a negative thing .Therefore; the military personnel would use coup-tactics that would 
lead to other forms of government (Clardie, 2010). As has been noted, it is in the interest 
of the new government to increase the military resource to overcome such a problem in 
the transitional phase. Huntington (1991) recognized the importance for the government to 
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Co-opt with the military by providing them with better housing allowancing, better 
salaries, and to increase the overall budget for military equipment.
10
  
The second reason behind increasing military resources is to ensure “domestic 
stability in the post-transition democratic environment” (Clardie, 2010, p.4). The logic 
behind this argument is that often countries that go to the process of democratization 
generally face conflicts and chaos. Some of these conflicts could be tribal or civil or even 
simply the inclusion of new parties in the political sphere (Clardie, 2010). As a result, new 
democratic countries face political insecurity and instability. For that reason, democratic 
governments need to assure their survival and should have a strong military power that 
can stabilize the country when needed. Moreover, a strong military would provide the new 
government with the legitimacy needed to control the country (Makara, 2012). However, 
one should not simplify the role of the military, because increasing the military resources 
might lead to internal conflicts with the new democratic government (Clardie, 2010). This 
argument lead to the second school of thought that recommends weakening the military 
role to achieve democratic transition.  
Similar to the first school of thought that recommends empowering the military, the 
literature on the second school also provides two reasons on why transitional governments 
need to decrease the resources given to the military. The first reason suggests the fear of 
military intervention in domestic politics, since the military has greater resources in hand 
(Clardie, 2010). Therefore, it is the best solution for the newly democratic government to 
limit the resources of the military in order for it to play a minimal role in changing the 
domestic politics (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003).  According to Clardie (2010) the paradox 
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 These may include new airplanes, defensive weaponry, military tanks etc...  
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of maintaining domestic stability may be a potential threat to the democratic government 
once the military is strengthened. The second reason behind decreasing military resources 
is its economic impact on the society (Clardie, 2010). Furthermore, newly democratic 
countries need to focus on re-allocating these resources in favor of the society. Such 
resource re-allocation could be in better education, social welfare, and consolidating the 
democratic system in the country (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995).  These tasks will lead to 
better public support for the democratic transition and would create the proper legitimacy 
needed for the government to operate. However, if the government decided to increase its 
resources towards military budget, this may lead to a social in-justness that would hurt the 
democratization process (Clardie, 2010). 
The role of the military affects the scenario of the democratization process. It is vital 
for the military and the new elected representatives to have a strong relationship that is 
defined according to democratic principles. If the military bass leaders decided to nourish 
the newly democratic transition, the country would most likely follow a relative peaceful 
transition. With the military blessing, the democratic government could sustain stability 
and focus on the economic prosperity of the country.  On the other hand, if the military 
personal saw the democratic process as a negative thing, this could lead to a violent clash 
between the newly elected government and the military army. With this happening, it is 
certain that the process of democratization will be followed with violent acts and conflict 
between different institutions and different groups in the society. To conclude, these are 
the two main schools that study the military effects on transition towards democracy.  The 
first favors the full participation and strengthening the role of military during the 
transitional phase. On the other hand, the second school of thought tries to minimize the 
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role and power of the military in the domestic politics. Moreover, it is for the best of 
government to create the proper relation with the military institution to eliminate any 
possible violent scenario in the democratic process.  
2.4 Civil society role in democratic transition  
 
In order to understand the role of civil society in shaping the transitional outcome it is 
important to define and categorize the different institutions in the civil society. Before 
doing so, it is best to see the origins of civil society in the word of the famous Greek 
philosopher Aristotle
11
. Essentially he defines Politike Koinonia as: 
a public ethical-political community of free and equal citizens under a 
legally defined system of rule. Law itself, however, was seen as the 
expression of an ethos, a common set of norms and values defining not 
only political procedures but also a substantive form of life based on a 
developed catalogue of preferred virtues and forms of interaction. (Cohen 
& Arato, 1992, p.84) 
Aristotle‟s definition introduces modern civil society in its basic elements; this shows 
that since early times civil society has played a major role in the political sphere. 
However, the notion of „Civil Society‟ is rather blurred, unclear or simply undefined and 
continuously evolving. For the context of this thesis, the World Bank definition of civil 
society will be adopted:  
To the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations 
that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of 
their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, 
religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community 
groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, 
indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, and foundation. (2010) 
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Concerning the relationship between the transition to democracy and civil society; 
democratic theory presupposes that civil society: 
should act merely as a support structure for democracy proper at the level 
of the state-shaping parliamentary deliberation by providing a voice to 
public opinion, educating citizens in democratic values, and generally 
acting as a watchdog over those in power, but otherwise leaving the real 
business of democracy to representatives.(Baker, 2002, p.928) 
Therefore, according to Gideon Baker (2002), the relationship between the civil 
society and the democratic system is inseparable. Moreover, as has been showed civil 
society is not considered to be private sector nor state sector, but rather it acts as mediator 
between these two sectors (Yom, 2005).  Indeed, many academic scholars such as Sean 
Yom (2005) view civil society as a systematic tool that is ideal and central for the 
entrenchment of democratic transition. Furthermore, civil society institutions are related to 
the democratization process through both internal and external ways. According, to 
Booker Magure (2008) “internally civil society engenders cooperation, solidarity, public 
spiritedness and trust (develops social capital) while externally it calls for a limited 
government that is responsive and accountable to its citizenry” (p.31). Despite the fact that 
all civil actors‟ (i.e. NGO‟s, faith-based organizations etc...) main aim is to work for the 
common good of the citizens, they might have different conceptions of what makes a 
“common good” (Kocka, 2004). In addition, civil society is an important tool for the 
public to spread their demands and make sure that their voices are being heard.  By doing 
so, civil society has the chance to influence the decisions of the government. During the 
democratic transition, civil society plays a major role in organizing and facilitating the 
proper environment that best serves the democratization process (Kocka, 2004).   
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The civil society is an important institute in determining the specific transition 
scenario. As the civil society groups are independent from the political sphere, it implies 
that the process of democratic transition is most likely to be peaceful one. Moreover, an 
energetic civil society would strengthen citizens‟ demands and enforce the respect of both 
parties (i.e. state and its civilians) and promotes positive engagement of both parties. In 
contrast, the lack of civil society in the democratic transition could lead to violent 
transition in the country. With the absence of civil society, governments have no 
independent institute to be accounted for their actions or to expose corrupted conducts of 
public officials. Thus, the absence of civil society as a watchdog for the public officials 
would create the legitimacy for governments to repress their citizen‟s demands for reforms 
and economic enhancements. By doing so, any attempt for democratization will be 
followed with violent acts that hinder the process of democratization. To conclude, civil 
society (often called the third sector) plays the role of a mediator between the public and 
its government. The basic role of the civic actors is to hold the government accountable 
for its acts and help them consolidate the democratic transition in the country. While there 
are many interpretations for civil society, they all stress on the importance for democratic 
transition by changing public attitudes, protecting human rights, and encouraging the rise 
of institutions of law. As a result, the word “civil” means tolerance and promoting 
pluralism and diversity in the country.  
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2.5 Social media role in democratic transition 
 
For centuries media
12
 was an essential tool for many authoritarian regimes to control 
the flow of information and to spread the regime‟s ideology all over the country.  
Moreover, the ability for the state to monopolize the media in the country assured the 
regimes‟ manipulation of information and control over what is right and what is wrong 
in the eyes of the government. However, due to the advancement in technology, it is no 
longer applicable for the authoritarian regime to control the information flow to its 
citizens. Therefore, it is not a secret that modern media (or what Kaplan and Haenlein 
(2010) describe as new media) has a major effect on the process of the democratic 
transition. According to Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) there are six types of new media 
that revolutionized the flow of information.  
The six types are:  
1. „Blogs‟ (i.e. personal/ celebrity weblogs, Twitter) 
2. „Collaborative projects‟ (i.e. Wikipedia) 
3. „Content communities‟ (i.e. YouTube,) 
4. „Virtual game worlds‟ (i.e. Everquest) 
5. „Social networking sites‟ (i.e. Instagram ,Facebook) 
6. „Virtual social worlds‟ (i.e. Second Life) 
(Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p.61-3). 
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While others
13
 may include other types of modern digital media such as mobile 
phones and modern satellite television, this dissertation will focus only on the effects of 
social media on democratic transition.  
Perhaps the social movement theory is the most prominent theory to describe how 
social media can become a part of the political change in the country (i.e. transition to 
democracy). According to Hank Johnston (2011) Social movement is defined as: 
made up of multiple organizations, as well as less formal groups, 
circles and nonaffiliated individuals. Members and groups coalesce 
around an issue or grievance to make their demands known publicly, 
and show their force to representatives of the state in order to effect 
a change. (p. 13-4) 
It could be concluded from this definition that, social movement is collective 
action that consists of ordinary citizens along with more influential citizens 
seeking to start a new public change by mobilizing the members or groups and 
unifying them to force the government to change.  Therefore social movement 
theory often empowers the popular interests instead of the elite interest, and is 
often referred to as “politics by another means – popular politics, not elite politics” 
(Johnston, 2011, p. 1). 
In order to have a successful social movement it has to be built on “a campaign 
around limited but important objectives, that are winnable, and that can engage a broad 
collation of people” along with “small but real successes” (Hackett & Adam, 1999, p. 
130-1). Without a doubt, social media is an ideal example of a social movement. Citizens 
are mobilized with new ideas, and ambitions to establish new policies or to improve 
existent ones. It is no longer applicable for the authoritarian regime to control their 
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citizens.  Now with the help of social media, people are no longer passive consumers for 
the government propaganda. Modern social communications are not new characteristics of 
social movements, but rather a new kind of social power that made people control the flow 
of information‟s rather than accepting it. The new social media challenges the hard 
physical power of the state through the process of decentralizing the state hegemony. 
According to Robin Thompson (2011) social media differs from traditional media because 
“anyone with a cell phone can become a reporter and take a cell phone video of news 
while it is happening” (p. 171). The advancement in modern technology had enabled 
people to organize and discuss matters that the states can no longer control.
14
 Undeniably, 
the revolution in social media had profoundly affected social life and culture whereby 
“Facebook and Twitter actually welcome and encourage users to support causes for 
political and/or social change” (Thompson, 2011, p.168). 
Nowadays, people don‟t need to be in a physical place to revolt against the 
authoritarian regime; instead people can become journalists who expose the regime‟s 
corruption and brutality that traditional media couldn‟t. It is best described in the words of 
Manuel Castells (2009):  
The powerful have been spying on their subjects since the beginning of 
history, but the subjects can now watch the powerful, at least to a greater 
extent than in the past. We have all become potential citizen journalists 
who, if equipped with a mobile phone, can record and instantly upload to 
the global networks any wrongdoing by anyone, anywhere .(p. 413). 
 Therefore, the new media (i.e. social media) is challenging the authoritarian regime, 
through collective actions and mass mobilization in cyber space where the regime can no 
longer has control. This process of decentralization of information and the wearing a way 
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of the authoritarian regime has created a new culture among the people to move towards a 
more democratic regime (Van Ham, 2010). 
 Social media has a great impact on the possible outcomes of the transition (i.e. 
whether peaceful or violent). With the possibility of free flow of information and the 
social media tool, citizens are now capable of accessing techniques to gather and organize 
themselves to overthrow any authoritarian regime. Likewise, the authoritarian regimes can 
no longer hide their brutality (if they decided to repress the uprisings) from the rest of the 
world. This new form of technology has diminished the role of the authoritarian regime to 
repress the people aspiration for democracy and equal rights. Therefore, with the new 
media help it is no longer applicable for the regime to use violent acts against its citizens. 
Rather, it would allow for a more peaceful negotiation between the elites and their citizens 
for a new democratic system. On the other hand, the absence of social media usage would 
allow governments to repress any demands for democratic transition. Therefore, people 
would go for more violent acts, such as military overthrow to overcome the authoritarian 
regime.  
2.6 Economic disparity role in democratic transition: 
 
Many Political scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) have long suspected 
that an association exists between economic development and transition towards 
democracy. One reason offered for this relationship is that people demand democratic 
transition as their country becomes economically better off because of enhanced 
economic conditions. These economic enhancements can spread democratic desires and 
ambitions over a wide range of people (Dahl, 1989; Huntington,1991). Moreover, 
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advancements in economic development would promote democracy because non 
democratic countries may change their political systems since they are able to afford the 
cost of having a democratic system.
15
 Under this assumption, many have started to see a 
relationship between economic development and democratic transition. For that, this 
paper will examine how economic inequality may lead to democratization.  
There are three main schools of thoughts which argue that economic inequality 
among people would lead either to democratic transition or to a repression of the people 
desire to democracy.  First school of thought is argued by different scholars such as 
Edward Muller (1995) and Robert Dahl‟s (1971). These authors claim that authoritarian 
regime is less likely to democratize in case the economic inequality is extremely high, 
due to the fear of redistributing the wealth among the people. In other words, the cost for 
democratization in the eyes of the regime will be higher than the cost of maintaining the 
gap between the elites and the populace. Thus, it is at the higher levels of economic 
disparity, the cost of redistribution the wealth outdoes the cost for the regime to repress 
the revolts (Houle, 2010). 
The second school of thought is given by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson‟s 
(2006) work on “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy”. These two authors 
argue on the ability of some countries not to democratize (mainly oil rich countries), is 
due to their ability to maintain equal economic distribution among its people. Therefore, 
the fear of any revolts by the regime is not found as long as the economic distribution is 
equal (Houle, 2010). In other words, citizens are content when they have relatively equal 
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distribution of wealth; therefore, they have no affiliation to overthrow the current 
political party (even if it‟s authoritarian).  
On the other hand, the third and final school of thought given by scholars such as 
Lipset (1959) and also been discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argues when 
regimes realize  that the costs of redistribution is lower than the cost to democratize , 
they will change their authoritarian system to a democratic one. In other words,  when 
the economic disparity is relatively in the intermediate level, people are motivate to 
revolt against the regime,  while the ruling party is unwilling to use force to repress the 
people due to the cost of redistribution is relatively low. Therefore, the regime elites are 
forced to democratize in order not to face the uprisings (Houle, 2010).   
The role of economic disparity is an important indicator on how peaceful the 
democratization process will be. With better economic equality, people start looking for 
other attributers to correlate with interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and political 
freedom (among many others). Thus, the representative‟s voters will have increased 
incentive to vote for people that promote democratic values. Moreover, the better the 
economic equality the better the educational system becomes. In other words, people 
with better education commonly follow peaceful resolution for conflicts during the 
democratization process (Lipset, 1959). On the other hand, when the gap between the 
rich and the poor is higher, it will lead to the social uprising and instability of 
democratic institutions. In other words, the higher the gap the more violent the protesters 
are willing to be to achieve some social justness between social classes. To conclude, 
economic disparities have a major impact on the democratic transition in any country. 
The need to understand the degree in which there is disparity between different classes 
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is important to anticipate the ruling party willingness to transit from authoritarian regime 
into democratic regime.  
2.7 Transitions in the Arab Spring  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Tunisian revolution followed by revolutions in 
the Arab world, many scholars attributed different theories and explanations on what 
made the revolution fail or succeed. This paper identified the most prominent views 
(social media, civil society, military army, and economic disparity) as the main 
indicators of determining whether this transition is peaceful or violent. However, these 
condition rank in importance and influence during the Arab uprisings. This paper 
identifies the order of importance as follows: first the military loyalty to the regime, 
second civil society presence, third the usage of social media, and finally economic 
disparity. During the Arab uprisings, the military army role was the most prominent 
attribute in determining the transitional scenario. For instance, in Egypt and Tunisia the 
role of the army was to withstand from any direct conflict with the protesters and to 
secure vital institutions of the country that eventually lead to a peaceful transition 
towards democracy. Whereas, in Yemen and Syria the military personal loyalty to the 
regime lead to a direct (in most cases armed) conflict with the protesters. These had lead 
to violent acts from both sides that attributed to the violent transition towards 
democracy. In Bahrain‟s case, the absence of strong military to support either the 
protesters
16
, led to a passive revolution with no true progress towards democratization.  
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The second condition is the presence of civil society. As mentioned earlier, civil 
society plays an important role in holding the government accountable for its acts and to 
raise awareness for its citizens about human rights and political freedom ( among many 
others). These civil society organizations (especially NGO‟s) played an important role in 
organizing and planning the protest movements during the Arab uprisings. In Egypt and 
Tunisia, where civil society is very strong, helped in determining the democratization 
scenario.  By acting as the watchdog for the regime brutality and supporting the 
protesters demands, the authoritarian regime of both countries had to submit to the 
protesters demands for democratization. Moreover, civil society groups, such as 
Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC), also known as Kefaya (Enough) managed to 
break the fear of people to peacefully protest against their leaders and to demand 
freedom. Thus, it is not unusual to acknowledge the role of civil society in the Arab 
Spring as the mediator for the protester and the new government. On the other hand, 
Syria and Bahrain lack the presence of civil society in these two countries. This absence 
had lead to major conflicts in the process of democratization. In Syria‟s case, protesters 
had no means of communication with the government through independent initiations; 
their demands were crushed by the military army. Thus, the protests became more 
violent and the process of democratization in Syria took the form of military combat 
between both sides. Whereas in Bahrain, protesters had gone passive with their demands 
due to the lack of presence from civil society (NGO‟s) that promotes democracy.  
The third condition is the usage of social media. Many scholars such as Muzammil 
Hussain argue that the Arab Spring would never happen without the help of social 
media. Although this paper acknowledge the importance of social media in the Arab 
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uprising, but it distance itself from this statement. Social media was a catalyst for the 
Arab uprising, not a reason for it. In the case of Egypt and Tunisia, these two countries 
have a vast amount of internet connectivity, with high internet penetration in the society. 
The advancement of social media gave the youth in Tunisia and Egypt the power to 
share the regime brutality and expose public official corruptions. For example, a 
YouTube video in Tunisia showed Tunisia‟s presidential aircraft on the runways of 
exclusive European shopping destinations, with a split screen showing the dates and the 
places asking who was using this jet. The suggestion was that Ben Ali‟s high living wife 
was the one using the jet (Howard& Hussain, 2011). Once this video circulated among 
the citizens in Tunisia, the regime tried to crack down YouTube and all social media 
such as Facebook. But with no luck such videos and pictures grouped the Tunisian 
citizen to act against the regime corruption. Moreover, the availability to upload videos 
and pictures made it difficult for the Tunisian regime to hide its brutality from its own 
citizens. On the other hand, countries like Yemen and to a lesser extent Syria have 
restrictions on social media sites by banging them. By doing so, the regime is able to 
control to some degree the flow of information to its citizens. Therefore, citizens tend to 
express their resentments towards the regime by violent actions that destabilize the 
democratic process.   
The final condition is economic disparity. For many scholars
17
 the main trigger for 
the uprisings was the socio-economic conditions of the country that lead to the increase 
of economic disparity between the rich and the poor. Yet, all the Arab Spring countries 
shared this commonalty between them. For instance, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, and 
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to a lesser extent Bahrain they all faced the same  economic problems ranging from 
poverty to economic disparity . The only difference is the relative economic disparity 
among these countries. This condition relies on the intensity of the disparity in each 
country. In the case of Syria and Yemen, only few people were entitled for economic 
advantages, while others suffered the severe economic conditions.  Although Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Bahrain suffered from economic disparity, they still managed to open their 
economy for foreign investments and tourism.  
2.8 Conclusion 
 
The literature review in this chapter has covered major themes and debates on 
transition toward democracy. In addition, this section highlights some key theoretical 
issues in the literature on violent vs. nonviolent transition and correlate it to the 
democratic revolutions. Furthermore, this chapter examines the theories on social media 
tools (blog, Social networking sites), civil society (NGO‟s mainly), military army (the 
two school of thoughts), and finally economic disparity (the three school of thoughts) in 
the context of their ability to affect the transitional outcome. 
 However, before testing and analyzing the variables that affects the transition to 
democracy in chapter four, the next chapter will discuss the methodology that was 
selected to undertake this study. The focus will be on the different relative levels of each 
condition to understand the outcomes of each transition, whether it would lead to a 
peaceful transition towards democracy or towards a violent one. By studying the 
commonalities of each condition with different countries in the Arab Spring, this paper 
will propose a theoretical index table which will help understand the effects of each of 
the four condition‟s major role in shaping the final outcome of the transition. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 METHODOLOGY 
“Not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be 
counted” Albert Einstein 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Given the literature, a comparative approach will be adopted in order to reveal the 
role of each condition (civil society, social media, economic disparity, and military 
loyalty) in the transitional phase, whether it is peaceful or violent. By focusing on each 
transitional condition independently during a crucial time and location within the Arab 
Spring countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain the outcome will be then 
compared among these countries to demonstrate the relationship for these different 
conditions. Moreover, this section focuses on already available data which will help 
understand the effects of each of the four condition‟s major role in shaping the final 
outcome of the transition. Therefore, this study relies on specific secondary sources of 
information which range from books, journals, seminars, statistical data, presentations 
and arguments concerning the interpretations of the Arab Spring. As such, this study 
serves as a framework of the preconditions of any peaceful (or violent) transition 
towards democracy.  
The qualitative research technique is the main tool employed throughout this paper. 
The significance of choosing this method is to identify how the research question will be 
answered. The focus of this study is on understanding and investigating how the four 
 33 
 
conditions (civil society, social media, economic disparity, and military loyalty) 
influence the democratic transitional outcome? The aim here is to uncover what 
attributes a peaceful or violent transition in the case of the Arab Spring. This section will 
present the different methods and instruments used in the study. This will elucidate the 
different advantages and disadvantages of these methods used in this research. Thus, it 
will be able to validate and justify the use and the purpose of the overall methodology 
used in this paper. 
3.2 Research design  
 
This thesis utilizes the qualitative research techniques as its research methodology. 
The process of utilizing qualitative methods allows different traditions and views to be 
accepted, therefore, creating valid and reliable measurement tools that can create 
generalization, with clear understanding of cause and effect (Lang, 2010) In general, the 
study is descriptive in nature, with this in mind; this allows examining the current issues 
by focusing on previous written sources of data such as case studies, journals, books, 
and annual reports. According to John Creswell (1994), descriptive study is an effective 
tool to present and demonstrate the facts about the position and nature of a given 
situation as it exists. This will enable the study to examine the different connections, 
along with the procedures and events, as the phenomenon happens. This method would 
provide a plan to describe, discover, and analyze the different issues and procedures. 
Furthermore, this will help in examining the factors that are related with the issues, by 
studying the event in a specified time frame, with the use of a cross-sectional study 
(Rubin & Babbie, 2012).  
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Cross-sectional research has great advantages and benefits to this study. One of the 
advantages is that it enables the examiner or the researcher to carry out the study in a 
relative short period of time (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000). As mentioned earlier, 
the qualitative research method is utilized in this dissertation in order to study the 
dilemma or the situation as it exists (i.e. Arab uprisings). Thus, the use of the cross-
sectional approach of different written sources of data will be useful to come up with the 
results and findings based on the Arab Spring situations. In fact, the aim of this study is 
first to compare (cross- section method) the four conditions in the Arab countries that 
witnessed the uprisings with each other and; second, to give a theoretical index for each 
variable and to conclude with a simple index number for each country. Further 
elaboration will be provided in the section on data collection and analysis. 
3.3 Research method 
 
This paper employs the usage of qualitative methodology, which means that non-
numerical data (while some sources used contain some numerical data) will be used 
throughout the paper. According to Norman Kent Denzin and Yvonna Sessions Lincoln 
(2005), qualitative method is described as: 
a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices which make 
the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn 
the world into a series of representations, including field noted, 
interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos 
to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that 
qualitative researches study thing in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of 
meanings people bring to them. (p. 3) 
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Thus, using qualitative methods makes it possible for the researcher to gather 
information by reviewing the literature about the Arab Spring. This enables the process 
of designing the data gathering instruments to be used. Moreover, qualitative research 
has a wide variety of instruments such as case studies, personal experiences, and 
introspection. These qualitative tools apply to a “wide range of interconnected 
interpretive practices, hoping always to get a better understanding of the subject matter 
at hand” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p.4). 
As such, this study can take advantage of the different benefits that qualitative 
research has to offer. First, using qualitative analysis can help the researcher understand 
the current situation better in ways the numerical data cannot achieve. Second, the 
flexibility of qualitative data allows for a comprehensive method for collecting data, 
along with the interpretations of these data given. Third, using the qualitative method 
allows for a complete overview of the issue being investigated. Fourth and final point is 
its ability to drive conclusions from primary and secondary data used in the research 
(Fryer, 1991). 
In addition, this paper will follow an inductive research process. In which this study 
will explore the written data ranging from annual reports to case studies to generate 
theory on what determines a peaceful democratic transition. For that, the process of 
triangulation (the process of gathering information from different sources) will be 
needed to create validity and reliability in this study. 
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3.4 Data collection and analysis  
 
Secondary data will be used in this study. As such, three types of sources will be 
utilized. First, the use of scholarly journals
18
 on the field of Arab Spring, these reports 
will generally explain the process in which each country experienced with the 
democratization process. This will allow for a clearer overview of the Arab Spring 
democratization process. Second, the use of periodic publications from various 
organizations such as the UN annual report, these reports will provide numerical data for 
this study to come up with a conclusion on the four conditions affected the transitional 
outcome. The third and final type of data collection is the use of trade journals on issues 
related to the Arab Spring. Such issues include the military behavior during the 
uprisings and the usage of social media during the uprisings, along with the existence of 
civil society in each country in the Arab Spring. Moreover, a theoretical index table for 
promoting peaceful transitions will be created for each variable/ condition
19
 in each 
country; as such, a simple scale from 1 to 7 in which 7 corresponds to “very high” in 
promoting peaceful transition , 3.5 is “passive” in promoting peaceful transition , and 1 
corresponds to “very low”  in promoting peaceful transition will be used. Moreover, a 
total score will be given for each country and will be indicate whether the process of 
democratic transition is peaceful, passive or violent. The index for the total score is (1-9) 
is considered to be an undetermined transitions, and (9.5 -18) as violent transition, while 
(18.5 -28) is considered as peaceful transition.   
                                                          
18
 Using some of the literature described in chapter two as background will be helpful  approach for this 
dissertation  
19
 Each condition weighs the same as the other, since each condition affects the other and may lead to 
different results. 
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To summarize the data techniques that will be utilized in this paper, a table of the 
four conditions, alongside with their technique and examples of the source that will be 
used is presented below.  
Table 3.4  
 
Conditions  Source of data  Examples of source of data  
Military loyalty to the regime  trade/scholarly journals  Makara, M. (2012). Effects of 
Coup-Proofing: Explaining 
Military Behavior During the 
Arab Spring. In APSA 2012 
Annual Meeting Paper 
 
Civil society presences  periodic publications/ scholarly 
journals  
Tenth Annual Report of Arab 
NGOs 
Social media utilizations  scholarly journals  Howard, P. N., & Hussain, M. M. 
(2011). The role of digital 
media. Journal of 
Democracy, 22(3), 35-48. 
Economic disparity  Periodic publications/ scholarly 
journals  
Corm, G. (2012). The socio-
economic factors behind the Arab 
revolutions. Contemporary Arab 
Affairs, 5(3), 355-371. 
 38 
 
3.5 Research limitations 
 
This paper identifies the four main prerequisites for a peaceful transition towards 
democracy. Nevertheless, this paper still has its own limitations and shortcomings. The 
main limitation of this thesis lies in the lack of time for conducting a comprehensive 
research; another limitation is the lack of resources (mainly money) to conduct a 
research survey where the researcher can collect primary data from key informants in 
the Arab Spring. Therefore, the researcher relies only and heavily on secondary data as 
the main source of information. Admittedly, a quantitative study with a large data set 
allows for more rigorous examination of the Arab Spring democratization process. 
However, this issue is overcome with a rigorous process of triangulation that will create 
validity and reliability in this study. In addition to these limitations, the focus of this 
thesis does not allow the researcher to examine or elaborate further on other factors such 
as the internal conflicts and the different political parties within each country.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will put into the test four major conditions that this paper has 
identified. The four conditions are: presences of civil society (mainly NGO‟s), economic 
disparity, military loyalty to the regime, and social media utilization discussed in chapter 
one. In each of the Arab Spring countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and 
Bahrain) the role of the four conditions will be tested and examined to demonstrate the 
relationship of these conditions on the transitional outcome. As such, a useful way to 
consider the four conditions is to examine each condition from a comparative 
perspective based on its relative existence or absence and then link the outcomes to the 
Arab countries that witnessed the uprisings, such as Tunisia and Yemen. Chapter four 
fully utilizes the framework explained in chapter three  that is  based on the different 
secondary sources of information which range from books, journals, seminars, statistical 
data, presentations and arguments concerning the interpretations of what triggered the 
Arab Spring (i.e. different theories), and assess the findings of this study through the 
lens of the proposed framework.  
First, a case study for each Arab Spring country will be described and examined in 
the context of the four conditions; a simple numerical index
20
 will be given for each 
condition on how it contributed in making the transition more peaceful rather than 
violent, then an overall numerical index will be given for the country. Second, the 
                                                          
20
 See chapter three for the measures used by the researcher.  
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analysis of these different numerical indexes will be provided in this chapter. The third 
and final step in this chapter is to define how these four conditions are interrelated to 
each other and how these conditions could be generalized to other countries that might 
go into the process of democratization. 
4.2 Tunisia 
 
Tunisia was the first country to witness what later become known as the Arab 
Spring. This movement came suddenly for Tunisian officials; including, the outcast 
former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Despite the huge attempts to halt the protests; 
Ben Ali‟s regime could not withstand the massive yet coordinated protests against the 
regime and had to submit to the popular demands. The four conditions that this paper 
identifies played a major role in determining the process in which the democratic 
transition had gone through in Tunisia.  
4.2.1 Military Loyalty to the regime 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the importance of the military position in the democratic 
transition is vital to the process of democratic transition. In Tunisia‟s case, the military 
has   defected to the opposition‟s demands after the regime‟s violent escalation towards 
the protesters. As a professional institution, the Tunisian military army was unlikely to 
crack down the protest demands, as in doing so the Tunisian army will defy its 
responsibilities to defend the democratic values, the society, and jeopardize the 
civilian/military relationship (Makara, 2012). Despite, the relationship that Ben Ali‟s 
regime established with the military personnel based on economic and political 
privileges, the military personnel were not threatened by the protest movements. 
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According to Michael A. Makara (2012) the Tunisian military‟s top personnel had no 
reason to protect Ben Ali‟s regime, for the fact that they did not perceive the rise of 
protest as harmful to their military privileges. On the contrary, standing beside the 
regime could harm the military leaders. Thus, the military position towards the regime 
resulted in a relatively peaceful transition that ended Ben Ali‟s regime. Therefore, the 
military homogony structure with the Tunisian population played an important role in 
the democratization scenario, thus giving it 6out of 7 in the index table created for 
peaceful transition towards democracy.  
4.2.2 Civil society presences  
 
In Tunisia, civil society groups were under heavy regulations, restrictions and 
often banned from operating on the Tunisian soil. Although, the Tunisian regime 
tolerated some civil society groups, in other cases the regime had to contain, manage 
and even co-opt the remaining civil society organizations (CSOs) for their own goals 
and needs (Deane, 2013). Despite that the Tunisian regime restrained and controlled the 
role of Tunisia‟s civil society groups, they still managed to exist in large numbers with a 
relatively high level of cohesive, integration and coordination in the Tunisian society. 
There is no exact number of NGO‟s operating in Tunisia, however, some estimate that 
there are over 9000 NGO‟s with around 500 registered after the Tunisian revolution 
(Tenth Annual Report of Arab NGOs, 2011).
21Thus, the relative huge number of NGO‟s 
operating in Tunisia (even if the scope of the civil society activates was under a tight 
leash from the regime) established the tools and procedure in which Tunisian citizens 
broke the barriers of fear, along with the process of gathering and organizing during the 
                                                          
21
  To view the report: http://www.shabakaegypt.org/report.php?id=11  
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uprisings. In the words of Shelley Deane (2013) “Tunisia‟s civic activists succeeded in 
bonding similar groups, while simultaneously bridging the gap between diverse groups 
around their opposition to the regime, and their demands for the free exercise of their 
rights as citizen”(p.15). As such, the mere existence of civil societies in Tunisia gave 
hand for the revolts to organize and understand their role during (even after) the 
uprising, which created a relative peaceful transition towards democracy in Tunisia. 
Therefore, the role of civil society in Tunisia was important for shifting the democratic 
transition into a peaceful one; thus, achieving 5 out of 7 in the index created for 
promoting peaceful transition towards democracy.  
4.2.3 Social media utilization  
 
Without a doubt the Tunisians were the pioneers in the Arab region in utilizing 
social media tools to share and expose the regime‟s brutality against the revolts in the 
Arab world.  According to Hussain and Howard (2011), social media played a vital role 
in the Tunisian revolution. For example, YouTube videos in Tunisia showing Tunisia‟s 
police brutality against unarmed civilians protesting against Ben Ali‟s regime. Such 
vides had sparked nationwide outrage and resentment against former president Ben Ali 
(Howard& Hussain, 2011). Once this video circulated among the citizens in Tunisia, the 
regime tried to crack down YouTube and all social media such as Facebook. 
Nevertheless, the activists and protestors pushed on, producing other gates for the 
servers and alternative online news broadcasts and spreading the news among fellow 
citizens about state persecution (Howard& Hussain, 2011). Thus, the utilization of social 
media in Tunisian‟s revolution was an important tool for mobilizing the protest and 
sharing information and plans against the regime‟s oppression. Moreover, the high level 
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of penetration of internet among the Tunisian society created a safe haven for bloggers 
and activists
22
 to create pressure (locally and globally) on the regime officials and 
security apparatus to meet the demands of the protesters. In one of the researches 
conducted on the role that social media plays in the Arab Spring, found that almost 25 
percent of the Tunisian population uses the internet at least once per day, with an 
internet penetration level of 66 percent of the Tunisian population that is under the age 
of 34 (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari, & Mazaid, 2011). With this in mind, the 
usage of social media tools such as Facebook and twitter was very high among the 
Tunisian citizens; therefore, achieved 6 out of 7 in the index table created.  
4.2.4 Economic disparity  
 
It is widely accepted that the revolution initially started in Tunisia from the 
economic woes that spreads all over Tunisian soil. The social economic tensions that 
Tunisia faces created a great resentment between the upper class and the lower class that 
eventually lead to the uprisings against economic inequality. Though, the official 
numbers provided by Tunisian officials during Ben Ali‟s period suggests an increase in 
the overall economic condition in the country, this was not the true. According to 
Georges Corm (2011) the overall growth model used by the Arab leaders is ineffective 
and represents what he calls it a bad growth model. For instance, in Tunisia‟s  case the 
rate of unemployment for fresh graduates jumped from 3.8 present in year 1994 to 17.5 
percent in year 2006 (Corm, 2011). In addition, the Tunisian regime‟s concentration on 
specific sectors such as tourism created inequality and economic grievances in the 
                                                          
22
  Though the Tunisian regime managed to arrest some blogger and activists in Tunisia, they failed to 
stop the flow of information, since many Tunisian activist where living outside Tunisian soil.  
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country. Such economical acts accrued the gap between Tunisian classes and created a 
clash between the upper (who naturally would not support the regime change) and the 
middle-lower classes that demand reforms. Therefore, the Tunisian economic disparity 
lead to relative violent clashes between the supporters of the regime and the protesters, 
thus achieving 4 out of 7 in the index created for peaceful transitions.  
 
4.2.5 Summary of the four conditions in Tunisia  
 
Four conditions  Index number out of 7 
Military loyalty to the regime  6 
Civil society existence  5 
Social media utilize 6 
Economic disparity 4 
Total  21/28 
Transition Scenario  Peaceful Transition  
 
4.2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this case study, Tunisia proved to be a peaceful transition towards democracy. 
By analyzing each of the four conditions that this paper indentified, one can understand 
why Tunisia unlike other countries witnessed a relatively peaceful transition. First, the 
Tunisian military is considered to be a professional institution with core values for 
protecting the civilians. Moreover, as has been mentioned before the Tunisian military‟s 
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top personnel had no reason to fear the raise of protesters due to many factors such as 
the country‟s homogeneity. Second, the mere existence of civil society groups in Tunisia 
played a major role in mobilizing the protest. This had a positive effect in educating the 
protesters who were eager for changing the regime.  Third, social media platforms had a 
major effect in speeding up the wave of protests and in mobilizing it. The fourth and 
final condition, the economic disparity among different social groups in Tunisia was the 
main trigger for the protest, though it may have helped in escalating the conflict. In the 
index table created for peaceful transitions, Tunisia scored a total 21 out of 28, therefore, 
the total score for Tunisia lays in the margin of peaceful transitions.  
4.3 Egypt  
 
Following the footsteps of its neighbor (i.e. Tunisia) the Egyptian people were 
inspired to form their own revolution against the long standing regime of Hussine 
Mubarak. The first demonstration erupted in Liberation Square in the heart of Cairo. 
23
 
Egyptians went to the streets in massive numbers, calling it a "day of rage". Thousands 
marched to downtown Cairo, calling for Hussine Mubarak to step down from the office. 
In just eighteen days, the former president Hussine Mubarak resigned from the 
presidency. Therefore, the four conditions that this paper identifies played a major role 
in determining the process in which the democratic transition went through in Egypt. 
                                                          
23
 The massive gatherings took place in Tahrir Square (liberation square) as it was seen as symbolic heart 
of the Egyptian revolution. These events took place over the course of eighteen days, from January 25 
2011, through February 11 2011. It is widely accepted that the main catalyst of the revolution was the 
Face book page, set up by Google executive Wael Ghonim, entitled “We Are All Khaled Said.”  
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4.3.1 Military loyalty to the regime  
 
Similar to the Tunisian army, the Egyptian army forces defected to the protesters 
side, effectively ending Hussine Mubarak‟s 20 plus year rule in the country. The 
military‟s refusal to open fire and to repress the demonstrations marked the end of one 
of the most authoritarian regimes in the Middle East region. Mubarak‟s military coup-
proofing strategy, according to Makara (2012) was centered on two tactics: building 
parallel security organizations and allocating material incentives to Mubarak‟s patronage 
and close military leaders. The main aim for creating the parallel security institutions is 
to oversee and defend Mubarak‟s ruling party and to make each security institution 
monitor the other for any attempt for military coup. Moreover, Mubarak‟s regime gave 
extensive economic and political benefits for his security services. Such benefits include 
“best salaries, housing, and health care in the country, and it controlled a variety of 
profitable private sector industries allowed it to ensure its economic fortunes even 
further” ( Makara, 2012. p.16). However, these strategies proved to be useless when the 
military had to choose between maintaining Mubarak‟s regime or in assisting the 
demonstrators. As a professional institution and as being  perceived as “part of the 
people”, the Egyptian top army leaders had to side with the protesters or face internal 
army defecation from military personal  who share the same socioeconomic conditions 
the protester suffer . Moreover, Egypt relative social homogenate gave the military top 
leaders a sense of relief knowing that their positions will not be threatened by other 
groups from the opposition. Therefore, as the protest demands escalated and Mubarak‟s 
regime hanging on its last line of hope for the military intervention. The later sealed the 
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regime fate by announcing that the president transferred the power to the military 
council (Howard& Hussain, 2011). Thus, the military played a huge role in the 
transition process in Egypt, therefore, achieving 6.5 out of 7 in the index table created.  
4.3.2 Civil society presences  
 
 The history of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Egypt could be traced back 
to 1821with the established of Hellenic Philanthropic Association in Alexandria 
(Khallaf, 2010). Like many Arab countries, Egypt lacks the exact figures and numbers 
on how many civil society organizations operate. However, some estimate that there are 
over 21,000 CSOs are registered within the ministry of Social Solidarity (Khallaf, 
2010). While other organizations such as the Arab Network for NGOs estimated that 
there are over 31,000 NGOs working in Egypt in 2011 with 2,500 new NGOs 
established after the revolution (Tenth Annual Report of Arab NGOs, 2011). Despite the 
lack of exact numbers of NGOs operating in Egypt it is clear that such organizations are 
the wheel that drove the youth to organize and demonstrate against Mubarak‟s regime. 
The most prominent organization was the Kefya movement (Enough movement) that 
was one of the first movements that called for the removal of Hussine Mubarak‟s regime 
in 2004. Such groups and organizations that work under the influence and control of the 
civil societies in Egypt created synergy among the Egyptian people to gather and 
organize themselves to overthrow the former president Mubarak. Moreover, the 
activities and events during the uprising organized by the Egyptian civil society ranging 
from coming up with the protesters slogans to direct action in the protest movements 
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gave a major push towards relative peaceful demonstration across Egypt. Therefore, 
scoring 6 out of 7 in the index table created.  
4.3.3 Social media utilization  
 
  For many scholars and researches, such as Philip Howard the Egyptian uprising 
could be accountable to the extensive use of modern day technology. Social media is a 
major part of modern day technology that assisted the youth to express and share ideas 
in ways the regime can no longer control. For the Egyptian people the inspiration of the 
Tunisian success traveled fast in the virtual world, and gave a breeze of hope for 
democratic change. In a study conducted to understand the role of social media in the 
Arab Spring, it was estimated that at least 10 percent of the Egyptian population uses the 
internet in a daily bases and an astonishingly 70 percent who are under 34 are 
considered internet savvy (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari, & Mazaid, 2011). 
Therefore, it is not unusual that the first spark in the Egyptian revolution came from the 
social media platforms. Many young educated people started tweeting and posting 
videos calling for gatherings and demonstrations against the regime. The well-known 
Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Saeed” that was created after the death of the 
28year old Khaled Saeed, who was tortured by the secret police, attracted over 400,000 
Facebook users in a relative short period of time (Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima, & 
Zhu, 2012). The link that social media provided between the social activists and the 
people who were working on the ground proved to be the best combination in which the 
regime did not anticipate. Thus, creating an unbreakable bridge between the social 
activists who where posting and tweeting for the outside world and with the people who 
were organizing peaceful protests. For that reason, the utilization of social media in the 
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Egyptian uprisings helped in shaping the final outcome of the revolution in a relative 
peaceful transition, thus scoring 5.5 out of 7 in the index table created.  
4.3.4 Economic disparity  
 
 As the Tunisian bad model of economic growth, Egypt suffered from a severe 
clash of classes between the lower and the upper class, along with the deterioration of 
the middle class. The economic woes that the Egyptian citizens suffered lead to the 
resentment that many middle-lower citizens felt towards the regime‟s economic policies. 
Although, Egyptian officials and some organizations such as the World Bank stated that 
Egypt is going through a positive growth, this was only benefiting some sectors in the 
Egyptian economy such as the tourism sector (Corm, 2011). Thus, according to Corm 
(2011), the bad growth model that Egypt like all Arab countries adopted had increased 
in the social and economic disparity in these countries. For instance, the lower class 
citizens who generally hold a secondary level degree make up 80 percent of the total 
number of unemployment in Egypt (Corm, 2011). Such figures correspond to some 
incidents that occurred during the Egyptian revolutions were some people who benefit 
from Hussine Mubarak‟s economic policies had got in direct or in an indirect conflict 
with the protesters that were demanding for his removal. As a result, conflict escalated 
between different groups of people who have different economic needs. Therefore, this 
condition scored 3 out of 7 in promoting peaceful transitions.  
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4.3.5 Summary of the four conditions in Egypt   
 
Four conditions  Index number out of 7 
Military loyalty to the regime  6.5 
Civil society existence  6 
Social media utilize 5.5 
Economic disparity 4 
Total  22/28 
Transition Scenario  Peaceful Transition  
 
4.3.6 Conclusion  
 
As the Tunisian case, Egypt succeeded in maintaining its revolution against Hussine 
Mubarak‟s regime a peaceful one. The role of the four conditions explains how the 
democratic transition in Egypt was relatively peaceful compared to other countries. The 
first condition is the military‟s loyalty to the regime, this was crucial during the uprising 
in which the military defected entirely to the protesters side.  As a professional 
institution and as being  perceived as “part of the people”, the Egyptian top army leaders 
had to side with the protesters or face internal army defecation from military personnel 
who share the same socioeconomic conditions the protesters suffer. Second, Egypt‟s 
strong civil society groups enabled the protesters to gather and organize in an effective 
way. Moreover, the action and activities organized by civil groups such as Kefya 
(Enough movement) during the revolution assisted the protesters in understanding their 
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demands in a peaceful way. Moreover, social media was an important tool in mobilizing 
the protest in Egypt. The Mubarak regime could not control the inflow of information in 
the country and had to fulfill the protesters‟ demands. The final condition, how the 
economic disparity among the Egyptian society increased the social tension. Such 
tension created violent conflict between pro-Mubarak regime and anti-Mubarak regime. 
Despite that, the economic conditions unified a large sector that was suffering economic 
inequality by the regime and led to the mass protests in the country. Therefore, in the 
index table created for peaceful transitions, Egypt scored a total of 22 out of 28 making 
it on the right margin of peaceful democratization process.   
4.4 Libya  
 
Following the events in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya witnessed another uprising and 
followed its Middle Eastern neighbor‟s steps in the removal of its authoritarian regime. 
However, the Libyan case proved to be more complicated than the two its former cases 
(i.e. Tunisia and Egypt); NATO had to intervene in order to stop the former president 
Muammar Gaddafi‟s brutality against the protesters (especially in Benghazi). This 
marked the first violent transition of what is now known as the Arab Spring. Therefore, 
the four conditions that this paper identifies played a major role in determining the 
process in which the democratic transition witnessed through in Libya. 
4.4.1 Military loyalty to the regime 
 
The former president Muammar Gaddafi‟s military strategy did not differ from 
his neighboring countries. As such, the Libyan regime established a sophisticated system 
of security institutions including the Revolutionary Committees (Al-Lijan Al-
 52 
 
Thawriyah), mercenary forces, and tribal militias. These security apparatus under 
Qaddafi‟s regimes were well financed and armed; in order to buy their loyalty. For 
instance, these armed personnel had the privilege to access expensive consumer goods 
that the Libyan citizens could not offer (Makara, 2012). However, what characterize 
Libya‟s security and military forces that these groups were grafted in a divided society 
between the “West” and the “East”. The socio-geographic division of the Libyan‟s 
helped the military and the security to defect during the uprisings. For Qaddafi‟s regime 
the Western region was his political and military base, which he relied heavily on 
kinship ties and tribal ties (Makara, 2012).
24
 Therefore, it is not surprising that most of 
the bass leaders in Qaddafi‟s security apparatus were from tribal clans and kinships that 
supported his regime. However, tribal conflict between the West and the East (in other 
words tribes that are allied with Qaddafi and tribes that oppose him) created a rift 
between these two regions that had unequal distribution of wealth and power. Thus, 
during the Libyan revolution the military personnel‟s that have anti-regime sentiments in 
the Eastern side of the region defected and allied with the tribes within that region to 
establish military forces against Qaddafi‟s regime. This marked the historical, political, 
and social rivalries between the West and the East that was embedded in the Libyan 
society. Such deterioration in the military structure escalated the violent clash between 
the military forces that cling to the regime with the military rebels that demanded the 
removal of the regime. This resulted in a lethal conflict that ended with the regime 
change, with the help from outside players.  This condition promoted violent transitional 
conflict in the Libyan case, thus acquiring 2 out 7 in the index table created for peaceful 
transitions.  
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 Margariha and Werfella tribes are the main two tribes to side with the Qaddafi regime 
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4.4.2 Civil society presences 
 
  The Libyan government allowed for the some civil societies and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in its province. However, these 
organizations had to modify their visions and goals to suite the regime‟s needs and goals 
(Rishmawi & Morris, 2007). For instance, the civil society groups could not issue goals 
or statements that contradict the revolution in Libya (this is the Qaddafi‟s revolution 
in the Jamahiriya state). However, the number of civil societies operating in Libya 
during Gaddafi‟s regime were very small when compared to Tunisia and Egypt, thus the 
role the civil societies played in the Libyan revolution was minimal. While there are no 
official numbers on NGO‟s operating in Libya during the Qaddafi rule, some estimate as 
few as 1000 NGO‟s were under the direct supervision of Qaddafi‟s regime (Tenth 
Annual Report of Arab NGOs, 2011). As such, the Libyan people had no independent 
organization to help and assist them in understanding democracy. Moreover, the lack of 
independent NGO‟s during Gaddafi‟s regime resulted in a gap between Libyan officials 
and its citizens. Thus, the lack of independent civil societies in Libya created conflict 
during the uprising were the revolts found themselves lacking the proper tools for 
conducting peaceful demonstration. Rather, they quickly escalated to the use of military 
force for change. Therefore, the lack of civil society achieves 2 out of 7 in the index 
table created for peaceful transitions. 
4.4.3 Social media utilization 
 
Again, the Libyan revolution proves to be different from the Egyptian and 
Tunisian case. Where, in the latter countries the utilization of social media was clear-cut 
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in assisting the revolts in their demonstration. But, in the Libyan case social media 
appears to have a minor role in these activities. According to Rasha Mourtada and Salem 
Fadi (2011) during the Libyan revolution only 4 percent of the total Libyan population 
had a Facebook account. This is not to underestimate the role of social media in the 
Libyan revolution. In fact, the prominent news station Al-Jazeera and many others relied 
initially on the videos and images that were circulated on the social media platform 
about Qaddafi‟s brutality against the demonstrators. Moreover, the use of these social 
media platforms enabled the revolts to create an international concession about the 
Libyan case. However, among the many things Libya lacks is the poor internet 
infrastructure that hindered the proper utilization of the social media. Such utilization 
could be in maintaining a proper communication procedure between the protesters in 
different regions and creating unified demands. Still, the social media platform did assist 
in making the democratization process more peaceful, thus achieving 4 out of 7 in the 
index table created for peaceful transitions.  
4.4.4 Economic disparity  
 
Libya shares with its neighbors the same socio-economic conditions that created 
tension among the Libyan society. High unemployment, rising food prices, and large 
income inequality all helped in increasing the tension level during the Libyan revolution 
(Corm, 2011). With an economy depending almost entirely on oil production, the 
Libyan government did little to create proper economic development in the country. 
Rather, the former president Mummer Qaddafi wasted the oil money on unimportant 
projects and wild schemes rather than allocating these resources to useful ones just in 
order to protect his regime (Cause, 2011). Moreover, the poor distribution of wealth 
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among the Western vs. the Eastern regions (more accurately between Pro-Gaddafi vs. 
Anti-Gaddafi regime) increased the speed of the military conflict during the revolution 
process. Thus, the poor economic conditions and the large disparity among different 
groups (or in Libya‟s case different clans) resulted in a great resentment among the 
different groups in the conflict and lead to a more violent process of transition. 
Therefore, this condition receives 3 out of 7 in the index table created for peaceful 
transitions.  
4.4.5 Summary of the four conditions in Libya   
 
Four conditions  Index number out of 7 
Military loyalty to the regime  2 
Civil society existence  2 
Social media utilize 4 
Economic disparity 3 
Total  11 
Transition Scenario  Violent Transition  
 
4.4.6 Conclusion  
 
Libya‟s case proved to be a very violent transition towards democracy, against the 
former president Mummer Qaddafi. The four conditions explained in this case, provided 
a clear understanding on why did this peaceful revolution turned ugly in a short period 
of time. The first condition, the military‟s loyalty to the regime, was split into two 
campuses. This deterioration in the military‟s structure escalated the violent clash 
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between the military forces that clung to the regime with the military rebels that 
demanded the removal of the regime. Moreover, the lack of any real civil society groups 
operating in Libya created a lack of proper tools for the Libyan citizens to demonstrate 
in a peaceful way. Rather, they found themselves quickly escalating into violent means 
to change the regime. Furthermore, the third condition concerning the utilization of 
social media had little desired effects on the Libyan revolution. As was mentioned, the 
poor Internet infrastructure hindered the proper utilization of the social media in the 
Libyan revolution. In the final condition, economic disparity between the Western vs. 
the Eastern regions (more accurately between Pro-Gaddafi vs. Anti-Gaddafi regime) 
divided the country into two sections. This created the resentment many Eastern clans 
had against the Western people. Unlike the Egyptian case in which economic disparity 
was between different social classes, in Libya the unequal distribution of wealth in 
different regions helped in escalating the violence during the transition. Therefore, Libya 
total score is 11 out of 28 which places it in the lower half of the index table created for 
peaceful transition.   
4.5 Syria  
 
Syria is another case of how the democratic transition that swiped the Arab 
nations is undergoing a violent demarcation process. The only difference between Syria 
and Libya is that the latter succeeded in overthrowing the authoritarian regime, while 
still the military conflict is dominating the transitional phase in Syria. The complexity of 
the Syrian case can be understood by studying the four conditions that play a role in the 
ongoing democratic transition. This will shed light on the Syrian conflict that is one of 
the bloodiest democratic changes in the new century.  
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4.5.1 Military loyalty to the regime  
 
The Syrian government was not safe from the Arab Uprisings, neither was the 
Syrian military army. In the early days of the Syrian revolution, the government like the 
military personnel was sure of their ability to repress the popular protest. However, this 
wasn‟t the case. Although historically the Syrian army was considered to be the main 
guardian of the Syrian people against the outsiders, the Baath party lead by former 
president Hafiz Al-Assad created an elaborate security institution that include the 
Republican Guard and most importantly the secret Intelligence ( Mukhabarat ) branches 
to overweigh the military power (Makara, 2011) . Although, according to Makara 
(2011), the security personal did not benefit from the economic benefits as in 
neighboring countries such as Egypt; however, they did benefit from generous military 
expenditures and the opportunities for exploiting their positions for financial gains.
25
 
Despite these measures, this was not the main coup-proofing strategy adopted by the 
Assad regime. Instead, the Assad regime relied heavily on communal ties by recruiting 
most of the security personnel from the Alawite Muslims
26
 who are consider a minority 
group encompassing  roughly ten percent of Syria‟s population and accounting for over 
90 percent of Syria‟s officer body (Zisser, 2002). Such strategy, created in the Sunni 
military personnel (who are considered to be the majority sect in Syria) resentment for 
not achieving higher military positions as their counterparts in minority groups including 
the Muslim Alawite, thus creating the base for defection during the Syrian Uprisings. 
Moreover, the ability for the regime‟s to take the minority groups as hostages; by linking 
                                                          
25
 For example, some Syrian officers in the Syrian-Lebanese borders exploited their positions to smuggle 
drugs and consumer goods into or out of Syria.   
26
  Obviously from the same sect as Hafiz Al-Assad 
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their fate to the regime survival enabled the Assad regime to maintain power (Makara, 
2012). However, such an act created military struggle between the official Syrian army 
with the defectives from the army along with civilians that refuse the Assad dictatorship 
(these groups to be later called the Free Syrian Army). This defection of military 
personnel into two campuses one favoring the Assad‟s regime survival and the other 
favoring the removal of the regime created undertone sectarian rifts in Syria that resulted 
in thousands of civilian casualties. Thus, the defection in military loyalty to the regime 
rather than the loyalty to the people had resulted in a violent transition process, thus 
getting a score of 2 out of 7 in the index tabulated for peaceful transition.  
4.5.2 Civil society presence 
   
Again, Syria proves to be a unique and challenging case when it comes to civil 
society‟s existence. During 1963 when the emergency law was enforced the Syrian 
officials saw this law as a tool for crushing any civil society organization in the country 
(Zahler, 2009). Though, after the death of Hafiz Al- Assad, his son Bashar Al-Assad 
took over the presidency and gave hope for democratic transitions. Initially, President 
Bashar Al-Assad started implementing new reforms, including the release of political 
prisoners, economic reforms, and human rights. This came to be known as the 
“Damascus Spring” (Lesch, 2011, p.421). However, the process of democratization did 
not last long, in just a few months President Basher Al-Assad fell under the influence of 
the old guard and started to adapt to his father authoritarian style (Lesch, 2011). As 
such, the hope for having any real civil society operating in Syria was lost. Since then, 
Syrian officials cracked down on any attempt to create civil society in the country. 
Therefore, Syria lacks any independent civil society organization; one can say that Syria 
 59 
 
has no truly civil society working on its soil. Having said that, the lack of independent 
civil society organizations in Syria that act as a mediator between the government and 
its citizens increased the level of conflict in the Syrian revolution, thus getting 1out of 7 
in the index table created for peaceful transition.  
4.5.3 Social media utilization  
 
Social media platforms were an important tool from the early beginning of the 
Syrian revolution. Due to the media blockage
27
 that the Syrian regime adopted, the 
protesters had to organize and plan their protest through the Facebook pages on the 
Internet. Despite that in some rural parts of the country lacking proper Internet 
infrastructure; it seems that most public demonstration had been organized with the help 
of social media tools such as the Facebook (Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima, & Zhu, 
2012). Moreover, with the current events in the Syrian revolution and with the regime‟s 
increasing brutality against the Syrian people. The latter are utilizing the social media 
platforms such as YouTube to fuel the public‟s outrage against the brutality of the 
regime. However, still the main methods of mobilization are held through traditional 
means such as prayer time or during funerals. This could account for the mistrust that 
people face when organizing protests in areas are not familiar with or simply due to the 
lack of Internet in these regions (Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima, & Zhu, 2012).  
However, such as cell phones that the regime is tracking down. Therefore, the utilization 
of social media in Syria had played a relatively major role in moving the democratic 
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 See more in Syria: ‘A Kingdom of Silence.’” Al jzeera English 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/20112910312-1562395 
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transition a bit further towards a peaceful transition thus getting 5 out of 7in the index 
table created.  
4.5.4 Economic disparity 
  
In the last decade Syria has shown an overall improvement in economic 
conditions, according to the World Bank and IMF annual reports (Corm, 2011). 
However, as its neighbors, Syria lacks the proper economic development needed for 
achieving real economic productivity and diversification. Moreover, the economy in 
Syria suffers from a severe economic stagnation, along with high level of unemployment 
(Zahler, 2009). For instance, people who work in the public sector have an extremely 
low salary starting at 164 US dollars when compared to other countries in the region, 
along with high unemployment reaching 20 percent of the total population (Corm, 2011; 
Zahler, 2009). Moreover, the levels of poverty in Syria are shocking, especially when 
one knows that Syria is not only rich in energy and phosphate resources, but also rich in 
fertile land and water resources (Corm, 2011). Furthermore, the gap between the rich 
and the poor increased the clash between social classes in Syria. To elaborate, in 
Damascus a rich person can go for shopping in brand new malls and sit in the sidewalk 
cafés reading the newspapers.  Meanwhile, on the other side of the country one can find 
workers working for 15 hours a day to make ends meet. Such a gap created the tension 
between people who are economically satisfied with Basher Al-Assad‟s economic 
policies and with people who suffer from the economic grievances. Thus, during the 
revolution one can see a clear social clash in Syria that resulted in escalating the conflict 
in the ongoing transitional phase in Syria; therefore, achieving 3 out of 7 in the index 
table created for peaceful democratic transitions.  
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4.5.5 Summary of the four conditions in Syria   
 
Four conditions  Index number out of 7 
Military loyalty to the regime  2 
Civil society existence  1 
Social media utilize 5 
Economic disparity 3 
Total  11 
Transition Scenario  Violent Transition  
 
4.5.6 Conclusion  
 
Why‟s Syria democratic transition is considered to be one of the bloodiest 
revolutions in the new century is difficult to understand. Despite all the external factors 
that played a role in the democratic transition in Syria, the four conditions that this paper 
identifies explains why Syria, unlike Tunisia and Egypt is undergoing a violent 
transition. In the first condition concerning the military loyalty, the Syrian government 
adopted a strategy relaying heavily on communal ties by recruiting most of the security 
personnel from the Alawite Muslims. Thus, creating resentment in a big portion of the 
Syrian community, that created the base for military defection. Hence, increasing armed 
conflict between two campuses one favoring the Assad‟s regime‟s survival and the other 
favoring the removal of the regime created undertone sectarian rifts in Syria. The second 
condition discuses the lack of civil societies in Syria, with this in mind Syria lacks any 
real presence of civil groups on its soil. Having said that, the lack of independent civil 
 62 
 
society organizations in Syria that act as mediator between the government and its 
citizens increased the level of conflict in the Syrian revolution. Third, social media 
utilization played a significant role in fueling the public‟s outrage against the regime‟s 
brutality, along with creating global consensus for the Syrian revolution. The fourth and 
final condition is economic disparity, in which the social gap is very high in Syria. Such 
a gap created the tension between people who are economically satisfied with Basher 
Al-Assad‟s economic policies and with people who suffer from the economic 
grievances. Hence, in the index table created for peaceful transitions, Syria scored a total 
of 11 out of 28; therefore, Syria lies in the lower margin of peaceful transitions. 
4.6 Yemen 
  
Yemen was no different from other Arab states that witnessed the awaking of the 
revolutions. Marking the end of more than 32 years of dictatorship lead by the former 
president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the latter resigned after huge popular demands.  The 
protests were lead by the severe socio-economic conditions that paralyzed the whole 
country and created rivalry between different districts. After the direct intervention from 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), President Saleh finally signed an agreement 
drafted by the GCC in November 2011, to give up the presidency in exchange for his 
personal and family‟s safety. Though, the intervention of the GCC succeeded in the 
removal of Saleh‟s regime, the Yemeni‟s revolution underwent a relatively violent 
demonstration to reach to this agreement. Therefore, the four conditions that this paper 
identifies played a major role in determining the process in which the democratic 
transition that was experienced in Yemen. 
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4.6.1 Military loyalty to the regime  
 
During the one year in which Yemen‟s revolution took place, many military 
officials and security officers defected to the protests side, while some maintained their 
loyalty to former president Salah. This partial defection divided the security institutions 
in the country into two sides. One side between the autonomous tribes who are against 
Salah‟s regime and the other, with President Salah‟s close patronage who are in charge 
of  the security apparatus in the country (Makara, 2012). As in the case of Libya, 
Yemen‟s military rift is accounted by the inappropriate distribution of wealth and 
position among different tribes in the country. As such, when the protesters demands 
began to include the president‟s resignation, some of the key member in the military 
force saw this as an opportunity to gain some influence(and probably for financial gains) 
started defecting to the opposition side (Makara, 2012) . This resulted in a military 
conflict between the military defectors (along with some tribal armed groups) and with 
the official army with the presidency‟s Special Forces who had great stakes in maintain 
the regime‟s survival. Thus increasing in the level of violent democratic transition that 
Yemen had undergone during the revolution, therefore, gaining 2 out of 7 in the index 
table created for promoting peaceful transition.   
 4.6.2 Civil society presences 
 
Under the Yemenis civil law all non-governmental organizations cannot be 
involved in any political activity, thus limiting its scope for development and 
humanitarian activities (Rishmawi & Morris, 2007). However, Yemen has one of the 
best diverse civil societies in the Gulf region.  Though they are no exact numbers of civil 
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societies operating on Yemen‟s soil, but there are a variety of “labour unions, self-help 
projects, development cooperatives, clubs, private schools, welfare associations and 
discussion groups” that assist the Yemeni citizens in improving their social welfare 
(Rishmawi & Morris, 2007.p.23). During the revolution, the official civil societies 
groups in Yemen did have a minor impact on organizing the demonstrations and getting 
plans for action against the regime‟s brutality. However, these civil society groups had 
little impact on the overall demonstrations in Yemen. In the case of Yemen, Mosques, 
family meetings, and private meetings among many others were considered to be the 
main venues for setting plans and establishing actions Saleh‟s regime. Therefore, despite 
the extensive presence of civil society in Yemen the utilization of these civil societies 
were minimal when compared to the role that Mosques (or other form of gathering) had 
on the revolution. Having said that, the lacking role of civil societies in Yemen and the 
great number of influential groups with different agendas and interests that mobilized 
protesters, led to an increase in violence during the democratic transition. Thus, civil 
societies in Yemen achieve 3 out of 7 in the index table created for peaceful transitions.  
4.6.3 Social media utilization  
 
The revolution in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria relied heavily on social media tools 
like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube in the early phases to speed up the social protest. 
However, the evidence shows that social media did not play a strong role in Yemen‟s 
revolution against Saleh‟s regime. According to “socialbakers” a website that monitors 
social media activities around the world, Yemen falls in the lower list of countries that 
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uses the Internet.
28
 Moreover, the level of internet penetration does not exceed 3 percent 
of the total population with only 512,000 Facebook users in Yemen.
29
  These numbers 
show that Yemenis people did not rely (though at first they did share the news of the 
former president Hussine Mubarak resignation) on social media tool to gather and plan 
for actions against the regime. Rather, the protester used the traditional methods such as 
announcing through Mosque speakers for gatherings and calling for demonstrations. The 
lack of social media utilization led to huge gap between protesters in different regions in 
the country, along with different course of actions against the regime   Therefore, it is 
clear that social media was not an active tool during the Yemen‟s revolution, thus 
achieving only 4 out of 7 in the index table created for  peaceful transition.  
4.6.4 Economic disparity  
 
 Yemen is considered to be the poorest country in the gulf region with a 27% 
inflation rate, 40% unemployment rate, and high level of government corruption (Hill, 
2010). Moreover, Yemen‟s dependency on oil exports makes it venerable to oil prices 
around the world. The oil industry accounts for over 90 percent of the exports and over 
70 percent of the government revenues (Hill, 2010). However, the rise of food prices, 
high level of unemployment, and high level of illiteracy contributed to increasing the 
armed conflict in the country during the revolution. Such a huge disparity of wealth 
between Selah‟s patronage ,along with business elites and with the Yemeni citizens, 
along with big tribal clans such as Al Mukalla, Ma‟rib, Radfan and the Ad-Dali created 
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 See more: http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/yemen 
29
 The largest group of Facebook in Yemen age 18-24, followed by users in the age of 25-34. See more : 
http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/yemen 
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armed conflict for economic privileges in the country. It is estimated that over 45 
percent of the Yemenis population is under the poverty line (Hill, 2011). Having said 
that, the gap created by Saleh‟s regime between the upper and the lower classes in 
Yemen established the resentment towards the people who benefited from the close 
relation with Saleh‟s family with people who suffered from his economic policies. These 
economic conditions in Yemen established the base for violence between pro-Saleh‟s 
regime and anti-Sales‟s regime. Therefore, this condition gets 3 out of 7 in the index 
table created. 
4.6.5 Summary of the four conditions in Yemen  
    
Four conditions  Index number out of 7 
Military loyalty to the regime  2 
Civil society existence  3 
Social media utilize 2 
Economic disparity 3 
Total  10 
Transition Scenario  Violent  Transition  
 
4.6.6 Conclusion  
 
The revolution in Yemen succeeded in removing the authoritarian regime, but process in 
which the revolution took place was a violent transition towards democracy. In the four 
conditions the paper indentifies, the role of each contributed in creating the scenario of 
the transition in Yemen. First the military rift accounted by the inappropriate distribution 
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of wealth and position among different tribes in the country resulted in an armed conflict 
between the defectors and the official military personnel. This led to an increase in the 
level of violence during the democratic transition that Yemen had undergone. Moreover, 
the role of civil society groups in the Yemeni revolution is weak when compared to the 
role of tribal leaders and religious figures. Having said that, the weak role of civil 
societies in Yemen and the great number of powerful groups with different agendas, led 
to an increase in violence during the democratic transition. The third condition addresses 
the social media utilization in the Yemenis revolution. The failure of the protesters to 
properly utilize the social media platforms in the Yemenis revolution had led to weak 
mobilization of protest all over Yemen. The fourth and final condition is economic 
disparity, in which the social gap is very high in Yemen. The breach created by Saleh‟s 
regime between the upper and the lower classes in Yemen established the resentment 
towards the people who benefited from the close relation with Saleh‟s family with 
people who suffered from his economic policies. Hence, in the index table created for 
peaceful transitions, Yemen scored a total of 10 out of 28; therefore, Yemen is in the 
lower half margin of peaceful transitions. 
4.7 Bahrain 
 
After the serious of demonstrations in the Arab world, a big portion of Bahraini 
citizens
30
 marched on 14 February 2011 to Manama, the capital of Bahrain where they 
camped for days at the Pearl Roundabout, which became later the symbol for freedom in 
the eyes of the protesters. In just few weeks the demonstrations became more violent 
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  According to the Daily Telegraph the majority of the protesters come from a Shia religious affiliation. 
See more: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/bahrain-wikileaks-
cables/8334600/BAHRAINS-SHIA-POLITICAL-LEADERS-VISIT-IRAQ.html   
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and the Bahraini government requested assistants from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to regain stability in the country. The latter replied on March 14 by sending 
troops that took charge of clearing the demonstrations in Pearl Roundabout and restoring 
order in the country. Despite these measures, the Bahraini opposition is still demanding 
for more political reform and greater economic privileges for the Shia population. Still 
the process of any democratic transition in Bahrain is in the stagnation stage. Thus the 
four conditions that the paper identifies, explain why Bahrain revolution is going into a 
passive stage.  
4.7.1 Military loyalty to the regime  
 
Bahrain‟s monarchy established the same communal strategies as the Syrian 
Baath party did.  The monarchy consists from Sunni leaders who only represent about 
25 percent of the Bahraini population, while the rest 75 percent are Shia (Makara, 2011). 
Having said that, the Bahriani rules had to adopt communal strategies where as the most 
of the security apparatus are controlled and operated by the Sunni minorities. Such an 
act fueled Shia grievances for not achieving top official ranks in the government. This 
was shown clearly during the protest movement where there was no military defecation 
from the Bahraini government.
31
 Therefore, the relative lack of any real military 
opposition created relatively peaceful protests in the Bahrain revolution.  However, with 
no tangible  political change in Bahrain, one can deduce that the process in which the 
military loyalty played role in the democratization process was passive, thus achieving 4 
out of 7 in the index table created for peaceful transitions.  
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  Although they had to ask help from the GCC to send additional troops to control the protests  
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4.7.2 Civil society presences 
 
After Sheikh Isaa‟s successor, Sheikh Hamad, launched reforms in the country, 
which included new laws for establishing new civil society organizations (CSO). In 
1999, Sheikh Hamad had asked the government to establish the first Human Right 
Committee, along with granting workers (local and foreign workers) the right to create 
and join unions (Rishmawi & Morris, 2007). By the end of 2004 over 350 civil society 
organization were established in the country (Rishmawi & Morris, 2007). However, the 
scope of these CSO‟s was limited only for developmental projects. According to the 
Bahraini law of civil society groups, the government can refuse to register any 
organization that have political agendas or that have the same tasks and roles that an 
existing CSO is already providing (Mahmoud, 2012). Nevertheless, despite these 
measures, Bahrain has a good standing civil society groups that assisted in halting the 
conflict between the government and the protesters (though it had a little impact). Thus, 
one can deduce that civil societies did play a role in making the process of transition 
towards democracy a relatively peaceful one, therefore, achieving 5 out of 7 in the index 
table created.   
4.7.3 Social media utilization 
 
Being a wealthy Gulf state, Bahrain has good internet infrastructure, along with 
extensive mobile phone utilization in the region (Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima, & 
Zhu, 2012). According to “socialbakers” a website that monitors social media activist 
around the world, Bahrain has over 400,000 Facebook users. This number when 
 70 
 
compared with the small number of Bahraini population
32
 , one can find that social 
media is largely utilized by the Bahrain‟s. Therefore, the social media had played a great 
role in mobilizing the protesters. With the help of social media platforms such as the 
Facebook and twitter, the internet was bombarded with pictures and videos footage of 
civilians being arrested or beaten up by the police during the revolution. However, 
Bahrain differs from the other Arab countries in which the government was successful in 
utilizing the social media for its own favor. The Bahraini government quickly acted and 
started to monitor all the social media activates and launched a campaign to find and 
arrest them (Dewey, Kaden, Marks, Matsushima, & Zhu, 2012). Therefore, the Bahraini 
government adeptness of social media utilization had proved that social media could be 
a double edged sword. Thus, achieving only 2 out of 7 in the index table created for 
peaceful transitions.  
4.7.4 Economic disparity  
 
Bahrain shares the same socio-economic conditions as its Arab neighbors. 
Unemployment and poverty, along with the lack of proper political representation, is the 
prime driver of the Bahraini revolution. What is more important is the disproportionately 
unemployment in the Shia‟ community that had led to social and economical grievances 
(Bahri, 2000). According to the Central Bank of Bahrain, in 2008, the average monthly 
salary, including allowances for Bahraini citizens working in the private sector, was just 
belowUS$1400.
33
 This, when compared to the gulf average monthly salary, one can find 
a huge disproportional between the two. Moreover, Bahrain dependence on oil money, 
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  According to the CIA Factbook the Bahrain population consists of 1,234,571 people, including 666,172 
non nationals.  
33
 According to Central Bank of Bahrain, Economic Indicators (Manama, 2008) 
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whereas, 77 percent of total government revenues are from the oil sector, had led to lack 
in economic diversification. With the dependency on oil production for revenue, Bahrain 
faces major obstacles in creating real economy that will halt down the economic 
grievances and inflation levels in the poorer sections of the society. Thus, Bahrain 
economic disparity between the Sunni and the Shia‟ has created resentment that helped 
in escalating the conflict between both. Therefore, achieving 2 out of 7 in the index table 
created for peaceful transitions.  
4.7.5 Summary of the four conditions in Bahrain    
 
Four conditions  Index number out of 7 
Military loyalty to the regime  2 
Civil society existence  1 
Social media utilize 2 
Economic disparity 1 
Total  6/28 
Transition Scenario  Undetermined  Transition  
 
4.7.6 Conclusion 
  
Bahrain‟s revolutions towards democracy, has yet to achieve its goals for 
change. Thus, one can say that the Bahraini revolution that ended with a passive 
transition towards democracy. The four conditions that this paper identifies explains 
why Bahrain, unlike other countries in the Arab Spring underwent a passive transition 
toward democratic change. In the first condition, the military loyalty to Bahrain‟s 
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regime was extremely high with no defection at all in the military structure. This 
enabled the Bahraini regime to maintain its status-quo, and to bring to an end the 
demonstrations that swept the country. With the lack of an armed opposition (i.e. the 
lack of military defectors to the opposition side) led to a passive movement that had 
little effect in achieving the protest demands. Moreover, the lack of independent civil 
societies to organize and activate the protesters led to weak protest movement. Having 
said that, civil society groups in Bahrain did not assist the protesters, rather they 
maintained their loyalty to the regime. This resulted in a lack of support from the NGO‟s 
that the protesters could have benefited from. The third condition social media platform 
played a passive role in the Bahraini revolution. As was mentioned, the government 
relatively succeeded in tracking social activists through the Internet and cracking down 
on any attempt to create demonstration events on social media platforms. The fourth and 
final condition, economic disparity in the Bahraini community created a rift between 
different religious sects. Thus, the disproportionate unemployment in the Shia‟ 
community that led to social and economical grievances increased the level of violence 
during the demonstrations. Therefore, Bahrain total score is 6 out of 28 which places it 
in the lower bottom of the index table created for peaceful transition. 
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4.8 Table summery for each country transition scenario  
Country  Military 
loyalty Role 
Civil society  
Role 
Social media 
Role  
Economic  
Disparity 
Role  
Transition  
Scenario  
Tunisia  Peaceful  Peaceful  Peaceful  Violent  Peaceful transition 
Egypt  Peaceful  Peaceful Peaceful  Violent Peaceful transition 
Libya  Violent  Violent Passive Violent  Violent transition 
Syria  Violent Violent Peaceful  Violent Violent transition 
Yemen  Violent Passive  Passive  Violent Violent transition 
Bahrain  Passive  Passive  Passive  Violent Undetermined  transition 
  
In the following chapter, recommendations will be giving on for each condition 
identified in this paper in order to enhance the chances of experiencing an overall 
peaceful transition in a country. Moreover, this paper will reveal the significance of the 
study‟s conclusions on understanding possible outcomes for countries that posse the 
same conditions the paper identified, along with the limitations that the researcher 
encountered throughout the research process.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This study represents an initial attempt to understand the relationship between the 
four conditions that are : the presences of civil society (mainly NGO‟s), economic 
disparity, military loyalty to the regime,
34
 and social media utilization
35
 ,along with the 
possible scenarios for democratic transitions in the Arab Spring,  Though the general 
topics discussed in this paper (i.e. the presences of civil society, economic disparity, 
military loyalty to the regime,  social media utilization, and transitions theory) are broad, 
the contribution to the field of international Affairs  is both specific and narrowly 
tailored to the Arab Spring events.  The focus on the Arab countries that witnessed the 
Uprisings highlights some concrete problems in the transition towards democracy in 
countries such as Syria and Yemen, along with contributing to the understanding of how 
others such as Egypt and Tunisia were relatively successful in witnessing a peaceful 
transition towards democracy. 
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 This paper uses the term military loyalty to describe a country’s regular army, while other terms such 
as security services include, but are not limited to Special Forces, police, and intelligence personnel. In 
order to use simple terms I will refer to these different branches as “armed forces”, while I will adopt the 
term “military forces” to describe the country’s regular army. 
35
 Social media in this context refers to blogs, social networking sites such as twitter and Face book, and 
content communities such as YouTube. In some cases I might refer to traditional  media such as Al-
Jazeera in the context of  the effect of social media in the Arab revolution  
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5.2 Recommendations for enhancing peaceful transitions  
   
This section will offer detailed recommendations provided by the researcher on 
the four conditions (military loyalty to the regime, the existence of civil society, the 
utilization of social media, and economic disparity) on how to enhance the chances of 
experiencing an overall peaceful transition in a country that posses the same conditions 
and attributes as some countries in the Arab Uprisings. Moreover, these 
recommendations will assist future researchers in this important field of study to better 
comprehend the complexity of the democratic transitions that the Arab countries 
experienced or still going through.  
5.2.1 Military loyalty to the regime 
 
As has been mentioned before, the military role during any uprising is curial in 
determining the possible scenario of the democratic transition. 
36
 Thus, one can see the 
importance of having a professional military with core values such as democratic values, 
protecting the society, and preserving the civilian/military relationship. With these core 
values, one can deduce that a country that has a professional military institution, along 
with an emphasis on professional military conduct will always side with the people‟s 
demands, rather than protecting the regime. Moreover, in order to achieve professional 
military conduct, it is important for the citizens to work in order to halt the coup-
proofing measure such as distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties 
that regimes create in order to protect themselves. Finally, it is crucial that the protesters 
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 Whether  peaceful , violent , or passive  
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placate the military personnel by assuring that they are part of the people and this 
revolution will not harm the top military personnel after the change of the regime.  
5.2.2 Civil society presences   
 
The role of the civil society is vital for educating the protesters and promoting 
peaceful methods that can be conducted by the protesters during a revolution. Civil 
societies are very flexible and resilient to pressure app by the regime. The ability of civil 
society groups and activists to work in secrecy is a very common thing in countries that 
do not tolerate independent civil groups. Though, the scope of their activities may be 
low, civil society groups can still educate the protester on peaceful tools
37
 for 
conducting protests and empowering young activists in the political arena. Therefore, 
even if the government is rejecting civil society groups to operate on its soil, the civil 
society organization can still manage to operate underground and in secrecy. However, 
the chances of a more effective protest lies in the ability for civil society to operate in a 
relatively free environment, this is not uncommon even in some authoritarian regimes to 
tolerate some civil society organizations in the country. Thus, people should refer to 
such groups and organizations for advice on how to promote peaceful demonstrations 
during any revolution.  
5.2.3 Social media utilization 
 
The importance of having well-educated citizens who are considered Internet 
savvy in promoting peaceful actions and methods to achieve democratic transition is 
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 Such tools could be by increasing the level of military personnel awareness  for achieving a democratic 
change 
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essential.  In some way, globalization has affected the role of the media in which it is no 
longer can be controlled by any regime. One can admit that social media is not the cause 
or the reason behind the Arab revolution; however, it was the median in which all the 
protests came to be. Countries that had good communication infrastructure such as 
Egypt, were able to exploit the benefits of social media platforms to great successes, 
while in other countries such success achieved due to lack of proper knowledge of social 
media platforms. Thus, a key factor is that citizens with the help of civil society groups 
should modernize their Internet infrastructure and educate its citizens on how important 
it is for them to communicate and use the new social media platforms.  
5.2.4 Economic disparity  
 
 The severe economic clash between different social classes in the Arab countries 
(though some were based on unequal distribution of wealth among tribal groups) led to a 
violent clash in some of the Arab Spring countries. To halt the economic and social 
grievances, civil society groups with help of the citizens using social media platforms 
need to pressure the government to adapt a new economic growth model for achieving 
equality and diversity among all citizens. As has been mentioned before, with high level 
of economic growth, people start to demand in peaceful ways more political and 
economic liberty. This will result in a more educated population that will ask for reforms 
that will end with a peaceful democratic transition. Thus, citizens should pressure the 
government to implement more liberal economical reforms (though it may hurt some 
local business in the short run, this new growth model will be beneficial for the society 
in the long run) so that different social classes do not clash with each other during any 
revolution.  
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 5.3 Summary of study and its implications  
 
The citation of key literature in chapter two reviews some of the major themes 
and debates on transition toward democracy. In addition, it highlights some key 
theoretical issues found in the literature on transitions to democracy, along with studying 
violent vs. nonviolent transition and correlates it to the democratic revolutions. 
Furthermore, chapter two examined the theories on social media, civil society, military 
army, and finally economic disparity in the context of their ability to affect the 
transitional outcome. The methodology, described in chapter three, utilizes the 
advantages of the qualitative research techniques. A framework through which the study 
utilized is a theoretical index table where each variable/condition in the Arab Spring 
countries is examined. Chapter four essentially puts into test the hypothesis that this 
paper identified (i.e. the four conditions role in transition towards democracy) and 
examined each country in the Arab Spring in the context of the four conditions. 
5.4 Limitations 
 
This paper identifies the four main conditions for a peaceful transition towards 
democracy. Nevertheless, this paper still has its own limitations and shortcomings. The 
main limitation of this thesis lies in the lack of time for conducting a comprehensive 
research in further understanding the deeply rooted grievances in the Arab Spring. 
Another limitation is the lack of resources (mainly monetary) to conduct a research 
survey where the researcher can collect primary data from key informants in the Arab 
Spring. Therefore, the researcher relies heavily and only on secondary data as the main 
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resource of information. In addition to these limitations, the focus of this thesis does not 
allow the researcher to examine or elaborate further on other factors such as the internal 
conflicts and the different political parties. Finally, the extent to which global players 
and the foreign interventions , such as the United States may have played a role in 
mobilizing the protests during the Arab Uprisings, by educating protest leaders to 
organize and implement action against the government through social media tools, civil 
society groups , and public appearances, while relevant, is outside the scope of the 
framework of this thesis. 
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